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The objective of this thesis is to assess the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects to facilitate a 
democratic transition within Egypt. Numerous studies have examined the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political ideology to objectively assess its consistency with democracy.  
However, to date there has been no comparative subjective study conducted to assess the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to facilitate democracy within Egypt. This thesis will 
attempt to fill that gap by subjectively measuring the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic 
intentions as perceived by other important actors within the Egyptian polity since the 
2012 Egyptian Presidential Election. The perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
democratic capacity and intent are critically important to assessing the likelihood of 
Egypt’s transition to democracy. To that end, the major research question of this thesis 
paper is the following: “what is the current perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
commitment to democratic compromise within the Egyptian polity?”   
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects to 
facilitate a democratic transition within Egypt. Numerous studies have examined the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s political ideology to objectively assess its consistency with 
democracy. However, to date there has been no comparative subjective study conducted 
to assess the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to facilitate democracy within Egypt. This 
thesis will attempt to fill that gap by subjectively measuring the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
democratic intentions as perceived by other important actors within the Egyptian polity 
since the 2012 Egyptian Presidential Election. A measurement of these subjective 
perceptions is vitally important because a meaningful democratic transition largely 
depends upon the Muslim Brotherhood’s inclusion of opposition forces within the 
Egyptian political system. In essence, the Brotherhood’s opposition must believe that it 
has an opportunity to gain political power. If the opposition does not hold this belief, the 
consequence would be fatal to a democratic transition because it would signify that the 
opposition believes they have no chance to participate in the political process and that the 
Muslim Brotherhood intends to permanently subordinate its political foes. As a result, the 
perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic capacity and intent are critically 
important to assessing the likelihood of Egypt’s transition to democracy. To that end, the 
major research question of this thesis paper is the following: “what is the current 
perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to democratic compromise within 
the Egyptian polity?”   
In furtherance of the thesis objective and the major research question, this paper 
will explore the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic capacity in three parts. The first part 
will define the objective foundational elements required for democracy. Additionally, the 
first part will define the spectrum of democracy that exists between what is known as 
“liberal” and “illiberal” democracies in order to lay the foundation for the possible 
paradigms that may characterize an Egyptian democracy. The second part of the paper 
will examine the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the most 
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recent political maneuvers of President Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), in 
order to assess the Muslim Brotherhood’s objective democratic capacity.   The third part 
of this paper will address the major research question and will attempt to capture the 
subjective perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic intentions based on a 
survey of interviews and commentary by the major political stakeholders within the 
Egyptian polity. The final part of this paper will conclude with an analysis of the 
subjective data in order to determine what conclusions can be drawn based on the 
perceptions of the Egyptian polity regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic 
intentions. The findings of the subjective analysis will be weighed against the findings of 
the objective analysis conducted in part two in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects for facilitating Egypt’s democratic 
transition.         
B. IMPORTANCE 
First and foremost, this research question is relevant and important due to the 
rising number of post-authoritarian transitions that have occurred within the Middle East 
North Africa (MENA) region since the Arab Spring of 2011. As these countries struggle 
with the transition to another form of governance, Islamists have increasingly led the way 
forward. This dynamic has created a situation throughout the MENA region where 
Islamists have been forced to contend with growing demands for representative 
government based up democratic ideals. Indeed, any meaningful transition to democracy 
in the MENA largely depends on Islamists’ support for democratic governance. Egypt is 
no exception and as it begins the shift from an authoritarian regime to democracy, it does 
so with a Muslim Brother as its first freely elected President. Consequently, Egypt 
represents an important first test-case for Islamist led transitions to democracy in the 
region—it will not be the last. There are profound changes of government currently 
taking place in Tunisia where Islamists are contending with post-Arab Spring transitions. 
Additionally, moves to democratic rule in the near future in countries such as Libya and 
Syria appear highly probable. Accordingly, a study of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and 
their democratic capacity at this critical time in history is essential given the growing 
trend of Islamist led transitions in states struggling with the aftermath of authoritarian 
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regimes. In short, the survival of democracy throughout the MENA region is in the hands 
of Islamists like the Muslim Brothers and the question that needs to be answered is “do 
they have the will and the capacity to carry out such an endeavor?”    
From a more narrow perspective, the strategic importance of Egypt’s geopolitical 
location cannot be overstated with respect to U.S foreign policy. Egypt is the largest Arab 
state in the MENA region. As the custodians of the Suez Canal in one of the world’s 
richest oil markets, the stability of Egypt is critically important to U.S. national security. 
The imperativeness of Egypt’s security and stability is clearly evident by the amount of 
foreign aid that Egypt receives from the U.S. on an annual basis. Indeed, “since 1979, 
Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. foreign assistance.”1  For 
the FY2010, there were only four countries that received more U.S. economic assistance 
than Egypt.2  And while the amount of assistance has decreased by nearly 25% in the last 
ten years, under the Bush Administration, the U.S. agreed to “continue to provide Egypt 
with $1.3 billion in military aid annually… [; more recently in] FY2012, the Obama 
Administration has requested $1.551 billion in total U.S. aid to Egypt.”3   
Looking toward the private sector, Egypt and the U.S. enjoy a strong relationship 
with regard to international trade. As number 48 on the list of the largest partners in 
international trade, the U.S. “ha[d] an annual trade surplus with Egypt amounting to 
$3.13 billion in 2009.”4  Furthermore, “Egypt is one of the largest single markets 
worldwide for American wheat and corn and is a significant importer of other agricultural 




                                                 
1 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt in Transition” (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, 2011), 
3, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33003_20110329.pdf. 
2 Sharp, “Egypt in Transition,” 3. 
3 Ibid., 3–4. 
4 Ibid., 8. 
5 Ibid., 8. 
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represents the second largest investor for Egypt with most of the money allocated toward 
the petroleum markets.6  In short, U.S. economic interest in the stability of Egypt is 
substantial. 
Furthermore, Morsi’s election to the Presidency represents a challenging dilemma 
for U.S. diplomacy because one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated goals is to Islamize 
the Egyptian government. Faced with this simple fact, “the United States [must] reverse 
decades of official policy shunning the Islamists and… come to terms with the newfound 
legitimacy and dominance of a group with whom it has had profound political and 
philosophical differences.”7  Added to the United States’ discomfort with the 
Brotherhood’s ascendancy to political power are several fundamental security concerns. 
Foremost, “the security risks inherent in contemporary Egypt include threats to its 
internal stability, to Israel despite a peace treaty, to other Middle Eastern states, and 
possibly to its neighbor to the south, the Sudan.”8  Some have even argued that Egypt 
should be categorized as a “failed state,” that enhances the risk of the internal 
proliferation of terrorist organizations and militant Islamic groups.9  Therefore, the extent 
to which the Muslim Brotherhood is able to consolidate power represents a major issue 
for the U.S. in terms of national security and foreign policy.   
In summary, this thesis is important for two key reasons. First and foremost, 
Egypt represents an important test case for democracy’s survival in the MENA region. 
Without the support of Islamists, democracy does not stand a chance and will be quickly 
supplanted by authoritarian regimes. Secondly, located in an extremely important and 
volatile area of the world, the strategic geopolitical importance of Egypt to the U.S. is 
well established. It shares an important economic relationship with the U.S in terms of 
international trade and foreign investment. Therefore, this study is timely and relevant 
                                                 
6 Sharp, “Egypt in Transition,” 8. 
7 Khaled Elgindy, “Egypt’s Troubled Transition: Elections without Democracy,” The Washington 
Quarterly (2012): 103, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springelgindy.pdf. 
8 Sherifa Zahur, “Egypt: Security, Political and Islamist Challenges” (Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2007): 3. 
9 Ibid. 
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given that the success or failure of Egypt’s transition to democracy represents significant 
issue with regard to U.S. foreign policy and national security.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The past two years have seen a historic transition of power in Egypt. An 
authoritarian government led by President Hosni Mubarak has been ousted by the will of 
the people who demanded reform toward a more responsive government. In dramatic 
fashion, Egypt has elected a member of the Muslim Brotherhood to lead the country. As 
the newly elected President Mohamed Morsi shepherds Egypt through the post-transition 
period, the unanswered question is whether or not he will be able to live up the to the 
spirit of Egypt’s Arab Spring and enable Egypt’s fragile new democracy. Certainly, it 
will be many years before the character and composition of this post-transitional 
government can take hold and mature. Notwithstanding, a discussion of whether or not 
the Muslim Brotherhood intends to facilitate such an endeavor, is timely and relevant. 
This discussion necessarily begins with an exploration of democratic theory in order to 
frame a workable definition of democracy.   
While there is no universally accepted definition of democracy, in The Third 
Wave, Samuel P. Huntington argues compellingly that any definition of democracy 
should be discussed in terms of “the nature of democratic institutions.”10  Huntington 
aptly “defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its 
most powerful collective decision makers are selected though fair, honest, and periodic 
elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult 
population is eligible to vote.”11  Moreover, in On Democracy, Robert A. Dahl provides a 
fairly simple and eloquent list of criteria that further defines the democratic process. Dahl 
argues the following: 
Within the enormous and often impenetrable thicket of ideas about 
democracy, it is it possible to identify some criteria that a process for 
                                                 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma, 1991), 7. 
11 Ibid. 
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governing an association would have to meet in order to satisfy the 
requirement that all the members are equally entitled to participate in the 
association’s decisions about its policies?  There are, I believe, at least five 
such standards.12 
Dahl opines that these five standards include the following: 
1. Effective participation  
2. Voting equality  
3. Enlightened understanding 
4. Control of the agenda 
5. Inclusion of adults13                           
The preceding seminal literature provides a basic procedural framework for 
democracy that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter II of this thesis. However, 
given the broad spectrum of democratic governance, the concepts of “liberal” and 
“illiberal” democracy should also be explored within the literature in order to further 
refine the objective criteria against which the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic 
intentions will be measured and judged.   In essence, the question becomes “where along 
the spectrum of democracy does the Muslim Brotherhood fall?”  The first of these two 
conceptual frameworks is the notion of a “liberal” democracy. In his journal article, 
Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One without the Other, Marc F. Plattner 
describes “liberal democracies” as “an interweaving of two different elements, one 
democratic in a stricter sense and the other liberal.” 14  Plattner depicts the “democratic” 
element in the most basic terms as “the rule of the people.”15  Given the impracticability 
of a nation state governed be direct rule, Plattner explains that “today it is further 
presumed that democracy implies virtually universal adult suffrage and eligibility to run 
                                                 
12 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 37. 
13 Ibid., 38. 
14 Mark F. Plattner, “Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One Without the Other,” Foreign 




for office” as fundamental elements.16  Therefore, the election process has been 
“regarded as embodying the popular or majoritarian aspect of contemporary liberal 
democracy.”17   
With regard to the “liberal” element of this conceptual framework, Plattner 
suggests that the essence of this notion “refers not to the matter of who rules but how that 
rule is exercised.”18  Most importantly, “liberal” infers that there is a limit on the 
government’s power over the people whose basic liberties are protected by laws—most 
commonly in the form of a national constitution.19  Indeed the essence of democratic 
liberalism is captured by “the idea of natural or inalienable rights, which today are most 
commonly referred to as “human rights.”20  The concept of “human rights” includes at its 
core what is considered to be “the underlying principle of liberalism—namely, that all 
human beings are by nature free and equal.”21  Moreover, Fareed Zakaria adds that “for 
almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy—a political 
system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a 
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, 
and property.”22 
However, as Zakaria suggests, “this bundle of freedoms—what might be termed 
constitutional liberalism—is theoretically different and historically distinct from 
democracy.”23  In his article Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Zakaria states that “if a country 
holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic.”24  However, the 
governments of many countries throughout the world meet this baseline definition of 
                                                 






22 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997): 
22, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53577/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy. 
23 Ibid., 22–23. 
24 Ibid., 25. 
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democracy including the “Iranian parliament—elected more freely than most in the 
Middle East—[yet,] impose harsh restrictions on speech, assembly, and even dress, 
diminishing that country’s already meager supply of liberty.”25  As a result, “illiberal” 
democracies are “in most of the democratization literature… defined negatively, by 
referring to what they are not.”26  Typically, analysts will begin the discourse by defining 
democracy within a procedural framework limited to the minimal requirements of a free 
and competitive election process.27  Upon identifying this baseline “illiberal” democracy, 
the literature will then typically “consider which additional attributes make democracies 
more or less functional in order to catagorise pseudo-democracies in terms of their 
shortcomings.”28   
In essence, by way of analogy, the notion of “liberal” democracy represents the 
“software” of the democratic system. It is characterized by the basic procedural 
requirements of universal suffrage and free elections. In addition, the “software” of 
democracy includes a robust respect for human rights and political freedoms protected 
within a national constitution.  In comparison, the notion of “illiberal” democracy 
represents the shell or the “hardware” of democratic system and is limited to the simplest 
procedural measures required to form a democratic regime. However, an “illiberal” 
democracy does not include the “software” inherent in a “liberal” democracy, and as a 
result, is characterized by a lack of protection for all but the most basic human rights and 
political freedoms. 
With a theoretical framework for democracy established, the next area within the 
literature deserving attention is the Muslim Brotherhood’s objective political capacity to 
commit to a democratic transition within Egypt. Indeed, as noted by Amr Elshobaki in a 
recent European Union Institute for Security Studies Report titled Egyptian Democracy 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, “when it comes to Egypt’s civil legacy and republican 
                                                 
25 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” 23. 





system, the Muslim Brotherhood has historically been an outsider.”29  However, that has 
changed with the Brotherhood’s formation of the FJP and their recent victories in the 
Parliamentary and Presidential elections. Elshobaki argues that the Society of Muslim 
Brothers has evolved and with the creation of the FJP “the movement had for the first 
time formed a political party, which, if Egypt succeeds in strengthening its institutions by 
reforming the security sector, the judiciary and the bureaucracy, may lead to the group’s 
full integration into a political process while building rather than undermining 
democracy.”30 
However, the Brotherhood’s capacity to carry out such a task is going to be 
largely dependent on the FJP’s ability to navigate the highly polarized political waters 
that are swarming with diametrically opposed stakeholders such as the Salafis and the 
secularists. Additionally, the Egyptian military complex poses a significant obstacle to 
the necessary development of state institutions. In his article When Victory Becomes an 
Option, Nathan J. Brown is far less optimistic than Elshobaki. Brown opines that the 
Brotherhood will be significantly challenged and their “claims of wishing to build an 
inclusive coalition… are likely to be far more difficult to realize, as the FJP’s 
performance has intimidated its rivals and led them to regard the Brotherhood’s strength 
as their biggest concern.”31  Even within what would appear to be natural political 
alliances, Brown argues that the commonality of Islamic faith may not be foretelling of 
coalition building either given that the Brotherhood’s interests are not as closely aligned 
with the Salafis as some may suggest. Additionally, Brown contends that that any efforts 
to close the distance with opponent secularist institutions will be problematic given “the 
polarization in Egyptian politics that has set in over the past year coupled with some 
                                                 
29 Amr Elshobaki, “Egyptian Democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood” (Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2011): 13, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Egyptian_democracy_and_the_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 Nathan J. Brown, “When Victory Becomes an Option” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2012): 9, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/brotherhood_success.pdf. 
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liberals’ and leftists’ strong fear of Islamists (a fear that has driven some straight into the 
military’s arms) would make such a task more difficult.”32  
In summary, the literature has provided a procedural definition of democracy and 
refined its scope within the context of two bookend concepts—“liberal” democracy 
which includes the “software” of democratic governance and “illiberal” democracy which 
represents the shell or the “hardware” of a democratic system. Additionally, while there 
is no clear consensus within the literature regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity 
for democratic governance, it is strictly objective in its scope. The literature is limited to 
the approach of applying democratic paradigms to the objective observations of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s political practices over time. However, the literature is currently 
silent with regard to the discussion of any subjective evidence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s democratic intentions; specifically the subjective evidence available since 
the 2012 Presidential Election. The purpose of the major research question is to fill this 
gap of subjective analysis by taking a survey of the perceptions held by the most 
significant stakeholders within the Egyptian polity with regard to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s willingness to share power, compromise, and participate in “pacting” with 
the elite of Egyptian politics since the Muslim Brotherhood’s President Morsi was 
elected.  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
There are two fundamental problems raised by this research question. The first 
problem is the lack of direct access to primary sources. Due to logistical and time 
constraints access, the research for this thesis will be conducted without the benefit of 
personal interviews or first-hand sources. Secondly, the Egyptian government is 
notoriously close-hold with regard to access to statistical and historical data, especially in 
the case of the military establishment. As a result, without the benefit of first-hand 
sources or reliable government statistical data, the conclusions of this thesis will be based 
                                                 
32 Brown, “When Victory Becomes an Option,” 9. 
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entirely on second hand sources such as academic journal articles, books, governmental 
reports (non-Egyptian), and other scholarly publications and news articles.    
The major research question and the subjective and objective analysis of this 
thesis lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  The subjective analysis indicates that the key members of the 
Egyptian polity perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be democratically inclined. The 
objective analysis corroborates the subjective data and suggests that the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s has the capacity to commit to democratic transition. Therefore, the 
Muslim Brotherhood is subjectively perceived to be committed to democratic rule and 
objectively possess the capacity to transition Egypt to a democracy.   
Hypothesis 2:  The subjective analysis indicates that the key members of the 
Egyptian polity do not perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be democratically inclined. 
However, the objective analysis supports the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood 
possesses the capacity (either intentionally or due to circumstantial default) to facilitate a 
democratic transition. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood has subjectively failed to 
create the perception to commit to a democratic transition. However, notwithstanding the 
perceptions to the contrary, the objective findings lead to the conclusion that the Muslim 
Brotherhood, due to internal or external forces, will be compelled to make concessions 
that will provide the foundation for a gradual democratization of the Egyptian 
government.   
Hypothesis 3:  The subjective analysis indicates that Egyptian polity does not 
perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be democratically inclined. The objective analysis 
corroborates the subjective data and does not support the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
commitment to democratic transition. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
subjectively and objectively failed to establish a capacity to commit to transition Egypt to 
a democracy and will continue to govern via authoritarian rule. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The method I will be using for this thesis will be a single case study regarding the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s intention to commit to a meaningful democratic transition. This 
single case study will begin with an attempt to find a consensus for the requisite elements 
of democratic rule. This first part will also attempt to define the spectrum of democracy 
that exists between what is known as “liberal” and “illiberal” democracies. The second 
part of this paper will examine the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
well as the most recent political maneuvers of President Morsi and the FJP, in order to 
assess its objective democratic capacity by comparing it to the foundations for democracy 
identified in part one. The third part of this case study will summarize the subjective 
perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic intentions since the 2012 
Presidential Election based upon a survey of interviews and commentary by the major 
political stakeholders within the Egyptian polity.           
The sources for this thesis will be based on second hand sources such as academic 
journal articles, books, governmental reports (non-Egyptian) governmental reports, and 
other scholarly publications and news articles. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Since President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP took power in the first 
free election of Egypt’s history, the transition to democracy has been watched with great 
interest by the United States and the international community. Of great concern to all is 
whether the FJP Islamists will fully adopt democracy as they consolidate their recent 
gains of political power. Given the highly fractured nature of Egyptian politics 
characterized by such polarizing political actors as the Copts, the Salafis, and the Military 
Industrial complex, if there is going be a meaningful democratic transition in Egypt it 
will be critically important for the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP to gain the confidence of 
their political rivals. Indeed, a key indicator of the opposition’s confidence is the current 
perception of the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy within the Egyptian polity.   
Therefore, the major research question of this thesis paper is the following: “what 
is the current perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to democratic 
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compromise within the Egyptian polity?”  This question is significant because if the 
Muslim Brotherhood cannot convince its political competitors that the FJP is committed 
to developing a democratic transition that provides an opportunity for political actors 
from outside the FJP to have a chance to gain power and influence policy, the opposition 
will inevitably be forced to take intractable positions. This outcome would be disastrous 
in terms of Egypt’s democratic transition because the Muslim Brotherhood will become 
much less likely to compromise with the opposing political groups. Instead, the 
Brotherhood will inevitably resort to undemocratic means in order to impose its political 
will.   
The first part of this thesis will examine the definition of democracy and its 
essential elements in order to establish an objective standard of democratic governance. 
In addition, it will also attempt to define the spectrum of democracy that exists between 
what is known as “liberal” and “illiberal” democracies in order to lay the foundation for 
the possible paradigms for an Egyptian democracy.    
Once an objective standard for democratic rule has been established, part two will 
examine the history and political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to 
determine its capacity and consistency with the foundational elements of democracy. This 
determination will be objectively deduced by comparing the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
political ideology to the objective elements required for democratic governance in order 
to fully assess whether the Muslim Brotherhood has the capacity to commit to the 
democratic governance of Egypt. 
The third part of this thesis will attempt to discern the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
democratic intentions via subjective analysis. It will be conducted by examining the 
public reactions to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood by the key political stakeholders 
within the Egyptian polity over the last 18 months. This data set will be acquired by 
reviewing the print and Internet news sources covering the political relationship between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and these key stakeholders in order to get a subjective sense of 
the Brotherhood’s perceived penchant for democracy. In essence, these sources will 
provide anecdotal subjective evidence of the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
willingness to share power, compromise, and participate in “pacting” with the elite of 
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Egyptian politics. Given the lack of first hand access to the leadership of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a comprehensive review of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
inclusiveness perceived by such key stakeholders will provide subjective evidence of the 
Brotherhood’s democratic intentions.   
The final part of this paper will conclude with an analysis of the subjective data in 
order to determine what conclusions can be drawn from the perceptions of the Egyptian 
polity in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic intentions. The findings of the 
subjective analysis will be weighed against the findings of the objective analysis 
conducted in part two in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s democratic capacity. 
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II. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY—THE FOUNDATIONAL ELEMENTS 
In early 2011, Egyptian’s gathered in Tahrir Square to protest President Hosni 
Mubarack’s authoritarian regime. Spurred on by the ousting of Tunisia’s dictator, 
protestors gathered by the millions and demanded for Mubarak to relinquish control of 
Egypt’s government. What the people wanted was justice and change from a regime that 
had become increasingly repressive. In its effort to maintain power and control over 
Egypt, during the last two decades “the ruling clique expanded the reach of the internal 
security and intelligence agencies, employing hundreds of thousands as informants, 
thugs, police officers, and other personnel to conduct ever more extensive monitoring of 
the citizenry.”33  The protestors were successful and the past two years has witnessed 
unprecedented political change within Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood has successfully 
elected their candidate to the Presidency. The question of the day is what will this 
Muslim Brotherhood led, Post-Mubarack transition look like?  At this point, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and their political arm of the FJP appear to be setting the stage for a 
transition to some form of democratic government. While the merits of preliminary 
conclusion will be addressed in the foregoing chapters, there needs to be an 
understanding of what democracy and its scope to begin the discussion. Therefore, this 
chapter will provide the baseline foundational elements which can be used as the 
framework with which to measure the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic capacity and 
intention via objective and subjective evidence.   
The first objective for this chapter is to identify a workable definition for 
democracy. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Third Wave suggests that over time scholars 
have developed three prominent frameworks that define the modern notion of democracy 
“in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by government, and 
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procedures for constituting government.”34  Huntington’s work disregarded the first two 
definitional frameworks due to significant issues regarding lack of fidelity and precision 
in their application.35  For The Third Wave, as will be for the purposes of this thesis, a 
procedural definition was used to encapsulate the meaning of democracy.36  Huntington 
argues that while other models of governance rely upon a system within which the 
leadership is ascended to power via “birth, lot, wealth, violence, cooptation, learning, 
appointment, or examination”—the democratic model is unique.37  Democracy is 
different from these other models because it is characterized as government system 
whereby “[t]he central procedure… is the selection of leaders through competitive 
elections by the people they govern.”38   
Therefore, this thesis adopts specifically adopts the following definition of 
democracy: “a political system… [within which] its most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.”39  
The benefit of this procedural definition of democracy is that it sets forth measurable 
benchmarks that allow for a meaningful discussion regarding the democratic nature of a 
particular country.40 
In order to develop a full appreciation for the aforementioned benchmarks of 
democratic governments, Robert A. Dahl’s On Democracy is instructive. In it, Dahl 
argues convincingly for the recognition of five fundamental elements or criteria required 
by democracy:  
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1. Effective participation  
2. Voting equality  
3. Enlightened understanding 
4. Control of the agenda 
5. Inclusion of adults 41                           
These criteria are imperative to ensure that all participants in the political arena 
are equal in terms of their respective ability to determine policy.42  A discussion of these 
criteria is important because a key underlying theme for this thesis is determining the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to adopt these processes and effect a meaningful 
transition to democracy within Egypt. In essence, these processes are instrumental to the 
sharing of power and are vital to any democratic transition. The first of these criteria is 
the requirement that there be effective participation within the political system.43  This 
necessitates that prior to the point that a decision is made “all members must have equal 
and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members as to 
what the policy should be.”44  The second criterion simply means that all members of the 
political system shall enjoy equal rights with regard to access and counting of votes.45  A 
more esoteric concept, the third criteria of gaining enlightened understanding essentially 
requires that “[w]ithin reasonable limits as to time, each member must have equal and 
effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely 
consequences.”46  The fourth criteria, providing the opportunity for final control over the 
agenda, is a safeguard against a closed process that would prevent members from the 
political system from participating in deciding “how and, if they choose, what matters are 
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to be placed on the agenda.”47  The fifth and final criterion is the necessary requirement 
to include all adults permanently residing within the geographic territory of the state the 
benefit of citizenship.48 
In summary, while there have been numerous definitions for what comprises a 
democracy, this thesis will adopt a procedural definition. Relying upon the frameworks 
provided by Huntington and Dahl, the baseline definition will be a system of governance 
characterized by a fair, periodic, and competitive process of elections wherein the right to 
vote is made available to all adults. Additionally, this baseline procedural definition will 
be used in conjunction with the aforementioned five criteria set forth by Dahl to ensure 
that all participants in the political arena are equal in terms of their respective ability to 
determine policy.49  Identifying these foundational elements of what encompasses a 
democracy and how to measure the democratic character of a particular political system 
will be applied in the foregoing chapters against the objective and subjective evidence 
relative to the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to effect a meaningful transition to 
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B. THE SCOPE OF DEMOCRACY—WHAT A POST-TRANSITION 
DEMOCRACY MAY LOOK LIKE IN EGYPT 
With the definition of democracy established the next necessary step is to 
examine the scope of democracy. Essentially, the baseline definition and the five criteria 
provide the foundation for a theoretical process that can be used to characterize a 
governing system as democratic. However, within that framework there is a broad 
spectrum of democracy and there are numerous democratic systems of government 
currently being used throughout the world that ostensibly meet this baseline definition, 
yet the nature of democratic rule varies greatly from one country to the next. In order to 
provide a fuller appreciation of what a post-transition democracy may look like in Egypt 
under the Muslim Brotherhood, the scope of democracy in its actual application must be 
discussed. The following will address what are essentially the left and right lateral limits 
of democracy in order set forth the range of democratic governance. Additionally, given 
the inherently problematic relationship between Islamism, the conservative expression of 
political Islam, and the comparatively far more liberal idea of democracy, an examination 
of this dynamic is important to frame the most probable and conceivable expectation for 
the context of Egypt’s democratic future. 
1. Liberal Democracy  
To expand on the forgoing discourse, “democracy is multidimensional concept, 
ranging from definitions based exclusively on institutional frameworks… to complex and 
integrated measures that include political and civil rights, democratic practices, values, 
and finally a diverse set of institutional arrangements in society.”50  Democracy is in 
many ways an exercise in power sharing. For there to be any meaningful sharing of 
power in a political system that includes such a complex association of diverging 
interests there needs to be a culture of inclusion. This is the very essence of a liberal 
democracy. It is “a project of inclusion of a plurality of people, classes, values, and 
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practices.”51  However, within this project of inclusion is an inherent tension that pits a 
political system that relies on inclusionary procedures against the rights of individual 
freedom granted by the same system.52  Going beyond the basic requirement for free 
elections, a liberal democracy requires on the outset vertical accountability which is “the 
absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not accountable to 
the electorate, directly or indirectly.”53  Secondly, a liberal democracy also demands that 
there be horizontal accountability between the various leaders of government.54  This 
requirement provides a check on the powers of the executive and serves to protect the 
rule of law and the democratic processes.55  Lastly, “it encompasses extensive provisions 
for political and civic pluralism as well as for individual and group freedoms, so that 
contending interests and values may be expressed and compete through ongoing 
processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic elections.”56 
Safeguarding all of the requirements for a liberal democracy is a robust and 
mature respect for the “rule of law.”57  Typically, the base document that forms the 
foundation for the “rule of law” within any country is a constitution. Indeed, the notion of 
“liberalism is essentially a doctrine devoted to protecting the rights of the individual to 
life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.”58  Government is the only institution 
with the capacity to protect those rights, yet this is a double edged sword because 
governments are also the most well positioned (and willing) institution to violate those 
rights as well.59  As a result, a constitution represents the essential tool within a liberal 
democracy that protects the people from their own governments. In this regard, the 
                                                 
51 Karstedt, “Democracy, Values, and Violence,” 57. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999):10. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 10–11. 
57 Ibid., 11. 
58 Plattner, “Liberalism and Democracy,” 79. 
59 Ibid., 79. 
 21
constitution is the first incarnation of what is now recognized as human rights law. This 
body of international law rose to prominence following the conclusion of World War II 
and is central facet to the mission of United Nations. The noble purpose of human rights 
law is simply to protect citizens from their own governments. The constitution represents 
the same protection for the citizens of a country in that it provides a limit on the 
government’s power to infringe upon the rights and liberty of the governed. And indeed, 
“for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy—a political 
system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, separation 
of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and 
property.”60  This collection of freedoms, protected by the rule of law, is the hallmark of 
liberal democracy. 
2. Illiberal Democracy 
Within the spectrum of democratic regimes, if liberal democracy occupies the left, 
to the right is the notion of illiberal democracy. The characterization of a government, 
assuming it meets the previously established baseline definition for democracy, as 
illiberal correlates directly with the number of individual liberties that government 
protects. Essentially, the fewer protected freedoms, the more illiberal the government. 
Consequently, “[i]n most of the democratization literature [these] pseudo-democracies 
are defined negatively, by referring to what they are not.”61   
Although the term “illiberal democracy” evokes a pejorative connotation in that 
suggests a government that adopts merely an empty shell of democracy within the 
western understanding of the word, however, “to go beyond… [this] minimalist 
definition and label a country democratic only if it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of 
social, political, economic, and religious rights turns the word democracy into a badge of  
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honor rather than a descriptive category.”62  Moreover, it is significant to recognize the 
fact that arguably “half of the ‘democratizing’ countries in the world today are illiberal 
democracies.”63   
3. Islamists and Democracy 
Having delineated the democratic framework in both definition and scope for the 
purposes of this thesis, a discussion regarding the inherent tension between Islamism and 
Democracy is required in order to acquire a complete contextual understanding of the 
major thesis question. Any evaluation of the Muslim Brotherhood’s penchant for 
democracy would be remiss without addressing the problematic relationship shared 
between political Islam and democratic governance. To begin, “[t]he issue of contested 
cultures and civilizations is especially important in assessing the prospects for democracy 
in the Arab world.”64  Indeed, “Huntington argues that Islam creates special obstacles to 
democratization: ‘To the extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from 
religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and 
contradict the premises of democratic politics.”65..These obstacles Huntington describes 
are becoming more and more relevant as two growing tides have been rushing toward one 
another.66  From the west, Democracy has come in high demand behind the wake of 
failed authoritarian regimes around the globe.67  And from the East, “Islamic revival and 
its extension as a political formula have also arisen, in reaction to the failures of 
modernism and secular socialism in developing countries.”68   
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One of the most compelling arguments in support of the proposition that Islam is 
incompatible with democracy is the conflicting values between the two systems. There 
are many western scholars who “assert that democracy and Islam are incompatible… 
[because] democracy requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of 
diversity.”69  In contrast, the Islamic faith has been characterized by an intolerance of 
intellectual freedom and absolute obedience for authority.70  Furthermore, “Islam is said 
to be antidemocratic because it vests sovereignty in God, who is the sole source of 
political authority and from whose divine law must come all regulations governing the 
community of believers.”71  Because of this belief that the authority to rule is essentially 
imparted by God and must be accepted with without dissent, some scholars have argued 
that political Islam can only support a totalitarian government.72  The question of 
sovereignty and where it originates is instructive from a standpoint of fundamental 
values. This is because “Islamism is focused on the capture and the remoulding of the 
state in accordance with what is believed to be Islamic law.”73  This is a key concept 
within this debate because the Islamist believes that “Islamic law is seen to supersede 
man-made laws, challenging the legitimacy of the political and legal frameworks that 
have maintained incumbent regimes in the Muslim world.”74  Indeed, for the Islamist, 
human reasoning and logic are discounted to the extent that the exercise of such attributes 
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state.75  In essence, “[t]he Islamist vision of a perfect society is diametrically opposed to 
the model of democracy, as the latter rests on the sovereignty of the people as the source 
of legitimacy.”76 
These contrasting values have been played out over and over again in the last few 
years. For example, democracy values the protection of personal freedoms over the 
community. Islam values the community over individual rights and the freedom of 
expression. The freedom of expression is attacked by the Islamists every time there is 
individual expression of an idea that offends the Islamic communities’ collectively 
delicate sensibilities. The outcry over Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses was 
banned in Muslim countries throughout the world because Islamic leaders found the work 
to be morally offensive.77  In fact, the Ayatollah of Iran issued a fatwa in 1989 that 
essentially called for Rushdie’s execution for the crime of blasphemy.78  This death 
sentence was doled out for a crime under Islamic law that, under democracy, would be a 
fiercely protected freedom of speech. 
A counter argument to the preceding theories suggesting that Islamic values are in 
direct conflict with democracy include the proposition that these theories have been 
created simply for the sole purpose of creating a divide between the East and West.79  In 
fact, critics of these theories opine that the view that Islamists are inherently predisposed 
to restricting expressions of personal freedom due to God’s inherent sovereignty “is a 
misreading of the sources of religion and represents a capitulation to extremist 
discourse.”80  Instead, the correct interpretation of Islam is that the protection of such 
personal freedoms is the sacred intent of God’s law.81  In fact some would argue that 
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“Islam has always expressed primacy of ‘adl,’ or justice, which is a close approximation 
of what the West defines as freedom.”82 
Yet, notwithstanding Huntington’s assertions, democracy is not inherently 
incompatible with Islam.83  In fact, the Quran is no different than the Bible in that “it can 
be interpreted to support many different types of political behavior and systems of 
government.”84  The Islamic text does not offer any specific support for democratic 
governance. Far more of the Quran’s guidance in the area of government is concerned 
with the “pious qualities expected of a ruler than on the way in which rulers should be 
chosen.”85   
While not inherently incompatible, when Islamists infringe upon the free exercise 
of the democratic process, Islam clashes with democracy.86  This incompatibility arises in 
situations “when political Islam, in the name of cleaning out the stables of corruption and 
alienation, promises to install a system where only those who subscribe to the true path 
are allowed into the contest for power.”87  In essence, democracy and its institutions are 
at risk any time the Islamists party in power places itself as the keeper of the state 
religion because this powerful position affords the ruler the ability to delegitimize its 
opposition.88  However, “[w]hen parties led by devoted leaders inspired by religious 
beliefs vie among others for a role in government, there is no incompatibility.”89  In fact 
there are a growing number of fundamental Islamists that accept democracy as a form of 
government that is consistent with the Quran’s notion of shura and are “prepared to go as 
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far as possible to support democracy—with the notable reservation that it should be 
maintained only within the limits set by shari’a.”90 
In summary, the preceding hypothetical transition is the exact scenario that set the 
conditions for the Muslim Brotherhood’s unlikely rise to power in Egypt after the 
January 25th Revolution. President Hosni Mubarack represented the corrupt authoritarian 
regime that needed to be removed. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the people’s 
choice to clean out the stables of corruption. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood is 
currently in the position that, if arranges the system in a way that nullifies competition 
from other parties and it takes for itself the role of Islam’s guarantor, it may be able to 
deny the opposition any meaningful role in the new Egyptian government. However, if 
the Muslim Brotherhood allows for the free exercise of the requisite democratic processes 
and chooses not to silence the voice of the political competition, then Egypt may have an 
opportunity to experience democracy with Islamists at the helm  
C. POST-AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
With the foundational elements for democratic rule established, the last part of 
this chapter will address the transition to democracy. To begin the discourse it is 
necessary to examine what exactly constitutes a transition to democracy. In the most 
basic understanding, a transition is simply the interim period separating two consecutive 
regimes.91  More specifically, “[t]ransitions are delimited on the one side, by the 
launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by 
the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, 
or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.”92   
A key indicator that a democratic transition is on the cusp of occurring within a 
country is the gradual loosening of the regime’s chains that inhibit the exercise of basic 
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liberties and freedoms for individuals and groups.93  Essentially, there will be the creation 
of some measure of space to freely associate and communicate in way that is consistent 
with basic human rights law. This has a domino effect on the regime in power because 
“[o]nce some actors have dared to exercise those rights publicly and have not been 
sanctioned for doing so as they were during the zenith of the authoritarian regime, others 
are increasingly likely to dare to do the same.”94 And the reason for this is because these 
unchecked liberal actions effectively lower the transaction cost of exercising such 
freedoms.95  Additionally, while liberalization of a regime is certainly reversible given 
that a regime maintains the ability to crack down arbitrarily and capriciously on such 
rights during the transition, if the regime does not feel threatened by this expanding 
bubble of freedoms, “they tend to accumulate, become institutionalized, and thereby raise 
the effective and perceived costs of their eventual annulment.”96  
The last central concept relative to the transition of an authoritarian regime is 
democratization. Related to the concept just previously discussed, democratization is a 
term that refers to the processes adopted to protect the liberties and freedoms that develop 
during the liberalization. It generally denotes the following set of developments that are 
integral to a democratic transition: 
The processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either 
applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles 
(e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative 
practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such 
rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic 
minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions 
not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military 
establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive 
enterprises, educational institutions, etc.).97 
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Indeed, there is no hard and fast rule regarding the time at which either liberalization or 
democratization take place during a transition.98  Moreover, they may not even happen 
simultaneously.99  However, a meaningful transition to democracy requires both elements 
to eventually occur and mature. 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF PACTING AND THE EGYPTIAN TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY 
If there is one word that captures the essence of Egyptian politics, it would be 
polarization. Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood finds itself caught between 
diametrically opposed political forces. There is scant maneuver space for compromise. A 
polarized political climate such as the one currently in Egypt requires flexible and 
dynamic leadership that can find middle ground and build bridges of trust between 
opposing political forces such as the Salafis and the secularists. Unfortunately for the 
Brotherhood, consensus building has never been their forte. Notwithstanding, “since 
President Morsi won the election, the Muslim Brotherhood [has] adopted more of a 
conciliatory tone and made an effort to reach out to non-Islamists.”100  Whether or not 
the Brotherhood’s efforts have been successful remains to be seen. However, some critics 
have opined that “it hasn’t [;]… It’s deep-seated [and] neither side trusts the other.”101   
According to Egyptian publisher and political commentator, Hisham Kassem, “the people 
had quickly lost trust in the Brotherhood, which reneged on a promise not to run a 
candidate for president this year [;] they concluded it was willing to say anything to 
secure power.”102  Indeed, with regard to parliamentary politics, the Brotherhood’s 
attempts to “build an inclusive coalition—whether formal or informal—however sincere, 
are likely to be far more difficult to realize, as the FJP’s performance has intimidated its 
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rivals and led them to regard the Brotherhood’s strength as their biggest concern.”103  
Consequently, the new Egyptian Parliament will a public stage on which the Brotherhood 
can share “its vision and perhaps to pursue selected legislative projects, but it will not be 
a place from which it will be able to govern or forge clear alliances.”104   
This dynamic is critically important in the case at hand because successful 
democratic transitions, particularly in situations of polarized politics, depend upon the 
creation of political pacts. Within in the present context, the concept of a pact “can be 
defined as an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a 
set of actors which seeks to define (or better redefine) rules governing the exercise of 
power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into 
it.”105 Essentially, both sides of must come to terms with the fact that they will not be 
able to achieve total victory and will consequently be forced to “see democracy as a 
second-best solution to intractable conflicts of interest.”106  Once this determination has 
been made by both sides, the mechanisms of democratic transition will begin to develop 
as the stakeholders begin to bargain for a piece of the pie. This bargaining process will 
often be achieved by participants with “no experience and little philosophical 
commitment to democracy.”107   
In practice, this “pacting” toward democracy occurs in a three step process. First 
the relevant stakeholders will be identified and mobilized during a lengthy and 
contentious political battle that will frame the polarized positions.108  This initial process 
will set the conditions whereby democratic tactics are adopted as a matter of necessity to 
achieve a given end-state.109  The second step is the point in time during which the 
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stakeholders “recognize a no-win stalemate and negotiate compromises… [wherein] 
democratic rules and various quid pro quos are agreed upon.”110  The final step is 
essentially the institutionalization of this give and take over time which eventually will 
create the expectation of democratic behavior by the stakeholders and the citizens whose 
interests they serve.111 
This is a crucial concept for the purposes of this thesis because the evaluation of 
the data collected in Chapter III will be directly correlated with the extent to which the 
stakeholders outside of the Muslim Brotherhood believe that they have a fair possibility 
of gaining political ground at some point due to the Brotherhood’s perceived willingness 
to engage in compromising pacts. In essence, this perceived hope of future victory is the 
incentive to withdraw from the intractable position and come to the bargaining table. 
These fundamental transitional steps toward democracy are “carried out by non-
democrats who had hoped to win everything, but learned through painful experience and 
stalemate that the possibility of winning something was better than the possibility of 
winning nothing at all or, indeed, losing everything, including one’s life.”112  It is 
imperative to democracy’s development that the losers believe that the future includes a 
reasonable degree of hope that they will have opportunity to compete and win.113  It is 
essential that the transition to democratic rule be the product from deliberate exercise of 
compromised agreements. It is only through “a bargained equilibrium that at once assures 
that no parties to the pact will be eliminated (part and parcel of winner-takes-all politics) 
and that the rules do not preclude the victory of a party in the future.”114   
There are significant historical examples of this form of pacting during the 
transition from an authoritarian state to democratic rule. Many of these examples are 
found in the numerous democratic transitions experienced in Latin America and Europe 
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where “political and economic elites have attempted to extricate themselves from the 
ruins of war or the reigns of tyrants.”115  An example that is arguably germane to the 
current transition in Egypt would be the democratic transition of Uruguay in the late 
1980s. Like Egypt, Uruguay was ruled by an authoritarian regime from 1973 until 1985. 
The Uruguayan Military was politically dominant as well and “ruled de jure by 
hierarchically led military from 1976 until a united military organization handed over 
power to a democratically elected president in 1985.”116  Arguably, the democratic 
transition began in Uruguay when the military removed the president and issued a 
referendum to the people in order to ratify a new constitution in 1980 that, “if ratified, 
elections with a single presidential candidate, nominated by the two traditional parties 
and approved by the military, would be held in 1981.”117  The political landscape 
changed almost overnight when the democratic opposition secured an unexpected victory 
at the polls and won the referendum.118  Indeed the military’s political leverage was 
severely diminished given that there was no legitimate internal threat and they did not 
enjoy a base of support from preexisting alliances within the political or civilian 
communities.119  Additionally, “with the loss of the plebiscite, whose results they said 
they would respect, the military-as-institution’s bargaining power with the politicians 
eroded significantly.”120  The military was not completely powerless however and was 
still able to negotiate for several important concessions from the opposition via the Naval 
Club Pact and that curtailed the field of presidential candidates and extracted “guarantees 
concerning the National Security Council and their own autonomy.”121  Additionally, it 
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was commonly known that an implicit agreement was made during the Naval Club Pact 
negotiations that military officers would be safe from prosecution for any crimes against 
the civilian population that were alleged to have occurred during military rule.122  After 
this gentlemen’s agreement was not honored the military attempted to test the states 
sovereignty by ordering the accused officers to ignore subpoenas to appear in court, the 
Uruguayan government quickly passed a law granting amnesty to “avoid the immediate 
crisis at the cost of the lowered prestige of democratic institutions.”123  Notwithstanding 
this apparent misunderstanding of the nature of the amnesty provision of the Naval Club 
Pact, taken on whole the negotiated settlement is largely viewed as a successful example 
of a pacted transition from an authoritarian regime to democratic governance. Indeed, 
“Uruguay is… consolidated institutionally; with the agreed-upon lapse of the Naval Club 
Pact, one year to the day after the inauguration of a democratic parliament, there were no 
de jure constraints on the policy freedom of the democratic government.”124 
Such pacts have also been used in the MENA as well in the recent past such as in 
Tunisia in 1988 with far more limited success. In November of 1987, the 84-year-old 
Tunisian dictator, President Habib Bourguiba, was declared incompetent by Prime 
Minister Ben Ali who then replaced the aged and ailing Bourguiba.125  A year later, 
President Ben Ali would celebrate the one year anniversary of his Presidency by 
appearing before the National Assembly, reviewing a parade in his honor, and watching 
16 of the elite representatives from within the Tunisian polity place execute the National 
Pact by placing their signatures of approval on the historic document.126  While the 
specific details pertaining to the inner workings of the pact are highly complex and 
beyond the scope of this thesis, this pact is a relevant point for consideration because “the 
liberal cast of the Tunisian National Pact reflects the fact that of the two elements of 
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democracy identified by Dahl—contestation and participation—it is contestation, not 
participation which is the novel and difficult element in the Arab world.”127 
Ultimately, negotiated pacts such as the previous two examples are unilaterally 
not dispositive indicators of a successful democratic transition or future democratic 
consolidation. There are many examples, including Tunisia, wherein such pacts were not 
enough to secure a successful transition to democratic rule. However, pacts are a proven 
enabler that set the conditions for success. The failure to develop such pacts places the 
transition to democracy at great risk. This is because the stakeholders will invariably lose 
the hope for future victory and will retreat to intractable positions. The “winner,” left 
without the democracy enabling tools of compromise and negotiation, will be inevitably 
fall back on the tried and true means for imposing their will upon the opposition. Left 
without viable alternatives, the “winner” will have no rational choice left but to adopt 
authoritarian methods that will extinguish any reasonable hope for the successful 
transition to democracy.  
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III. OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS–THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN 
THE CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY  
A. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF 
ISLAMIST POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in March of 1928 in 
the town of Isma’iliyya when he was approached by six men employed by the Suez Canal 
Company. These humble laborers had been so affected by al-Banna’s Islamic tutelage 
that they offered to be his loyal servants of Islam if he would be their leader in the name 
of Allah. It was at this moment that the Muslim Brotherhood was conceived when 
“Banna, duly moved, accepted the burden imposed on him, and together they took an 
oath to God to be ‘troops... for the message of Islam.”128  From these very humble 
beginnings the Muslim Brotherhood would grow exponentially and “by the outbreak of 
the second world war, into one of the most important political contestants on the 
Egyptian scene.”129  It would be during this period of growth through the first ten years 
of the society’s existence that al-Banna would call a series of conferences in which the 
embryonic mission and political philosophy of the Brotherhood would be articulated. At 
the fifth of these initial planning conferences al-Banna proclaimed that the scope of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s purpose was as follows: “[t]he idea of the Muslim Brotherhood 
includes in it all categories of reform’; in specific terms he defined the movement as ‘a 
Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a 
cultural-education union, an economic company, and a social idea.”130   
With the movement’s purpose clearly defined, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
development as an Islamist political organization occurred against the backdrop of a 
growing dissatisfaction with the British colonial presence. This period of political 
activism was marked by escalations of violence against the Egyptian government and 
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British military personnel following the end of World War II.131  While from the very 
beginning the Muslim Brotherhood was primarily concerned with Islamic reformation 
with a particular emphasis on education, the “political turbulence during the years of 
Egypt’s constitutional monarchy (1928–52) and the persistence influence of the previous 
mandate-power Britain over the country’s domestic affairs set the framework of the 
Brotherhood’s evolution into a political mass-movement.”132  This era was characterized 
by the gratuitous use of violence by a special paramilitary cell, called the Nizam al-
Khass, which reported directly to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, including al-Banna 
himself.133  While the level of al-Banna’s knowledge and consent is still debated to this 
day, the Nizam al-Khass committed several terrorist attacks that culminated in the killing 
of Sa’adi Prime Minister Muhammad al-Nuqrash at the end of 1948.134  This was shortly 
followed thereafter by the Egyptian Secret Service’s retaliatory killing of al-Banna in 
January 1949.135 
As the founding father of the most important Islamist organizations in modern 
history, al-Banna’s influence appears to resonate loudly within today’s Muslim 
Brotherhood. Arguably, al-Banna’s most important contribution to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s longevity was his profoundly pragmatic approach to dealing with the 
opposition.136  As a matter of course, “he repeatedly proved his willingness to be flexible 
in his principles for the good of the greater cause.”137  This strategy of patient 
accommodation would be played out on numerous occasions on the battlefield of 
Egyptian politics as al-Banna was a skilled politician who was willing to compromise his 
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beliefs and ideology for the greater good of advancing the Muslim Brotherhood’s long 
term policy goals.138  In fact, although “he was explicit in his condemnation of political 
parties in Egypt, referring to those that existed as ‘the parasites of the people’ and the 
‘greatest threat to our development’, at one point he proposed that the Ikhwan join Hizb 
al-Watani (the Nationalist Party)… because he believed the party’s immense popularity 
would assist his own movement.”139   
A very good example of al-Banna’s proclivity for pragmatism is the 1942 
parliamentary elections whereby the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to place 17 brothers 
on the ballot, including al-Banna (running to represent Isma’ailia).140  Campaigning on a 
platform of moral reform and the advancement of the Islamist agenda, al-Banna “came 
under intense pressure from the government to withdraw the Ikhwan’s candidacies and to 
make a written statement declaring his loyalty to the government and the 1936 Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, which was the legal foundation for the British presence in Egypt.”141  
Such a request was ostensibly unthinkable given the Muslim Brotherhood’s hardline 
stance on the immediate removal of Britain’s imperialist influence over Egyptian 
affairs.142  Notwithstanding, al-Banna went against the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance 
Office, and negotiated a compromise with the Egyptian government.143  The terms of the 
deal were that “in return for publishing an open letter supporting the treaty and 
withdrawing from the elections, he extracted a promise from Prime Minister Mustafa 
Pasha al-Nahas that the government would allow the movement to operate freely and that 
it would take action against the sale of alcohol and prostitution.”144  This example of al-
Banna’s penchant for pragmatism offers significant insight into how far he would go to 
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negotiate a pact or compromise with the opposition of the day in order to protect the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s continued existence145  
The period following al-Banna’s death was characterized by the rise to power of 
the Special Unit, or Nizam al-Khass. While a prominent Egyptian Judge, al-Hudaybi, was 
named as al-Banna’s successor, he was relegated by the Nizam al-Khass as nothing more 
than a public figurehead and was reportedly told by the elite military arm of the 
Brotherhood that “‘we want nothing from you; you need not even come to the 
headquarters. We will bring the papers for you to sign or reject as you will…We only 
want a leader who will be a symbol of cleanliness.’”146  This dynamic created confusion 
within the Muslim Brotherhood as the members were unsure of the direction the society 
was truly headed. On the one hand, al-Hudaybi was publicly renouncing violence and the 
secret agenda of the Nizam al-Khass. Yet, on the other hand, the Nizam al-Khass was 
extremely powerful and nearly ubiquitous with the Muslim Brotherhood movement.   
As the Muslim Brotherhood was being pulled into these two camps, President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser gained control over the Egyptian government following the 
revolution of 1952. On the outset, President Nasser enjoyed the support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood due to their hope that Nasser would make Egypt an Islamist state. That hope 
soon disappeared and the Brotherhood began to actively resist the agenda of the Nasser 
regime. This would prove to be a devastating turn of events as Nasser’s government 
responded by dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood in January 1954 and arresting members 
of the society in large numbers. The Nizam al-Khass was enraged and, when Nasser 
negotiated a treaty for evacuation with the British, they threatened to take action against 
the government. Ten months later, an assassin attempted to kill Nasser while he gave a 
speech in Cairo to commemorate the recently executed treaty with the British 
government. Although Nasser escaped unscathed, the Muslim Brotherhood would not be 
so fortunate and “the consequences for the Brotherhood were severe: the regime 
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retaliated by hanging six men and arresting thousands of Ikhwan, essentially crushing the 
organisation.”147  The assassination attempt on Nasser marked a 20-year long persecution 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
During Nasser’s regime, another influential leader within the Muslim 
Brotherhood emerged with a far less pragmatic approach than that espoused by al-Banna. 
Sayyid Qutb was a member of the Guidance Council and the editor of al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun, the Brotherhood’s weekly newspaper.148  Following the failed assassination 
attempt on Nasser, Qutb was arrested and spent the next ten years in a state prison. 
However, due to poor health, much of that time was spent in a hospital bed from where 
he would author some of the most influential writings on radical Islamic activism. 
Among the most widely known was his authorship of the book Milestones. This book 
would eventually serve as a “theological guidebook for radical Islamist groups which first 
evolved in the 1970s and which eventually progressed to today’s a Jihadist networks in 
and beyond Egypt.”149   
As far as the ideological impact of Qutb’s writings, there are mixed 
interpretations on how influential his conception of Islam was with respect to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political development. In this regard, Muslim Brothers have argued that 
Qutb’s legacy should not be limited to the ideas proffered in his seminal work, 
Milestones.150  Certainly, “[t]he diversity of his work is indeed impressive and 
encompasses several genres of literature, such as autobiography, poetry, literary criticism, 
religiously inspired analytical work and, last but not least, Islamist propaganda.”151  
However, the breadth of his literary works notwithstanding, there are significant 
suggestions that Qutb’s concept of the state includes the notion of authoritarian rule.152  
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This is clearly evident by the fact that Qutb’s writing articulates the need for a strong 
central leader that unilaterally delineates an inflexible interpretation of shari’a law upon 
the people.153  Qutb’s political concept of the authoritarian government model is 
important because in the area of Islamic legal scholarship, the body of law relative to 
non-religious matters is typically regarded as a matter in which common man have the 
legitimate freedom to determine acceptable regulations or laws.154  Overall, 
characterizing Qutb’s concepts of Islamic governance of society as a fascist theocracy is 
well deserved.155  In application, Qutb’s “approach to Islamic law could lead to the 
totalitarian control of a group that claims to have the rightful and true understanding of 
the Qur’an and of the law.”156   
However, as influential as Qutb’s writings may have been, they appeared to 
resonate more forcefully within the more extremist Islamist groups within Egypt. In fact, 
by the time of Nasser’s death in 1970 the Muslim Brotherhood had largely renounced 
violence and committed to “peaceful political and social engagement… in stern contrast 
to the violent activities of Egyptian terrorist groups… such as al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, al-
Jama’a al-Islamiyya (GI) or Jama’at al-Jihad (JJ) [which] were inspired by Qutbian 
ideas.”157  The Muslim Brotherhood’s pragmatism of this period was led by the once 
marginalized al-Hudaybi and coincided with a dramatic change in policy as the new 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat attempted to garner for the Brotherhood’s support by 
declaring a general amnesty.158  With Sadat’s regime marking a period of conciliation 
and “the end of persecution, the Murshid Hasan al-Hudaybi, and, after his death in 1973, 
his successor ‘Um al-Tilmisani, began to rebuild the Brotherhood’s public and political 
power.”159  This was only possible because, unlike Nasser who had a wealth of natural 
                                                 








charisma, Sadat was forced to develop an institutionalized base of support.160  Sadat was 
widely known as a religious man and he used this to counter the leftist and remnant 
Nassarist opposition. It was through “this process of legitimation [that] he accommodated 
the Brothers, but did not officially recognize their existence.”161   
While the Muslim Brotherhood’s creation and pragmatic beginning was due to the 
leadership of al-Banna, without question “Qutb and al-Hudaybi were important 
contributors who elaborated further the Brotherhood’s ideological, theological and 
juridical foundations.”162  Owed largely to the influences of these three men, the Muslim 
Brotherhood would over the course of the last 70 years develop their strategic posture 
that has been characterized by institutional patience and willingness to compromise. And 
although Qutb’s ideological contributions have undoubtedly led to the periodic use 
violence, such extreme methods of political expression appear to have fallen into disfavor 
over the past several decades.163  Indeed, “[a]t the center of internal discussions since the 
early 1970s are issues such as its position with regard to democracy and the Egyptian 
nation-state; related to these are also questions regarding the Brotherhood’s participation 
in elections and its view on economic liberalization and privatization.”164  Regarding 
these cornerstone issues, to date the Muslim Brotherhood appears to have embraced a 
highly cooperative approach that seeks to advance its objectives through democratic 
means instead of radical extremism.165  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic posture continued to develop and mature 
under the Mubarak regime. During this period “[t]he relationship between Mubarak and 
the Muslim Brothers… [was] shaped largely by their simultaneous pursuit of 
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legitimacy.”166  Mubarak was far more tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s 
because he believed that this would provide a solid foundation for the political legitimacy 
of the regime.167  This policy of tolerance would be reversed during the 1990s when the 
Mubarak regime cracked down on Islamist activism. Instead of seeing the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a potential benefit to his own legitimacy to govern, Mubarak began to 
perceive the growing power and influence of the society as a threat to his regimes’ 
existence.168  This is became a significant issue for Mubarak because of the way in which 
the Muslim Brotherhood was able to manufacture its growing legitimacy as not only an 
Islamic movement, but as a legitimate Islamist political organization that was capable of 
competing and winning elections to seats within the Egyptian parliament.169  In essence, 
“Mubarak was threatened by the fact that, despite their denial by the state, the Brothers 
were able to pursue an alternative ‘resource of legitimacy’ based on the recognition of 
society rather than on recognition of the state, and that this legitimacy was used in mass 
mobilisation.”170  However, the Mubarak regime misunderstood the end-state of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s political mobilization and wrongly believed that they were intent 
on throwing out the government when in fact, all the Brotherhood was attempting to 
accomplish was to force the Egyptian government to formally recognize the Islamist as a 
legitimate political organization.171  This marked a significant departure from the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s attitude toward participation within the Egyptian political framework and 
“during the 1980s the movement began to consider the idea of engaging in formal politics 
by establishing an alliance with a legal party.”172   
During this period of resurgent political activism, there were two significant 
developments of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political ideology that occurred during the 
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early part of Mubarak’s rule. The first development was the affirmative decision to 
compete in Egyptian parliamentary elections as an organization instead of running 
independent individual campaigns.173  The second development was the decision to 
compete in for seats in parliament “in alliance with a political party that was promoting 
another political trend in society.”174  In 1984, the Brotherhood would show signs of their 
capacity to compromise and pact with their political opposition by forming an alliance 
with the New Wafd Party.175  While the Muslim Brotherhood was still not able to enjoy 
the freedom of forming their own independent and legitimate political party, in an 
attempt to legitimize the 1984 Parliamentary elections, Mubarak allowed the Brothers to 
join in a political alliance with the New Wafd Party.176  The intent of the Brothers’ foray 
into the formal political process was that it would gain access to lawmakers within 
parliament that would enable them the ability to potentially reform the Egyptian 
government from the inside out.177  At the same time, this approach would also allow the 
Brotherhood to “show the officials and the public that the movement has adopted a non-
violent approach to the state and to society.”178  The Brotherhood’s newfound 
willingness to form coalitions broadened further in 1987 when the society “extended its 
strategy to initiate a tripartite coalition between MB, liberal Wafd and socialist Labour 
(winning 36 seats).”179  Although the election results produced by these political 
alliances were notable, the alliances presented a threat to the Mubarak regime and the 
National Democratic Party (NDP).180  Mubarak, fearing the rising tide of the opposition, 
“changed the electoral law form a party-based system to one based on individual 
candidacy for seats in constituencies.”181  This attempt by the regime to control the 
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election results was met by a complete boycott of the next election by all of the regime’s 
opposition parties.182  The next three elections were characterized by a crack-down on the 
Muslim Brotherhood by the regime, yet the Brotherhood slowly and steadily increased its 
representation in parliament culminating in the election of 2005 wherein the society 
achieved a “landslide victory, winning 88 seats or 20 percent of the total, making it the 
largest opposition bloc in the history of the Egyptian republic.”183   
The Muslim Brotherhood’s alliance with the New Wafd Party and the social 
Labour party is particularly helpful in developing a contextual understanding of the 
development of the society’s political ideology. It was at this precise time “that the 
movement had managed to redefine its stand with regard to the complexities of the 
political reality and of Muslim society, in contrast to the position of Sayyid Qutb, which 
continued to exert a powerful influence until the late 1970s.”184  Creating distance from 
the hardline set down by Qutb that strictly defined what it meant to be a Muslim, the 
Muslim Brotherhood adopted a far more flexible approach as it entered the political arena 
in the 1980s.185  The movement was able to gain a foothold in parliament by cooperating 
with long-standing political opponents. Additionally, the Brotherhood made the tactical 
decision to concentrate their efforts in support of broader issues of national concern while 
subordinating more contentious religious issues in order to accomplish the primary 
objective of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood from out of the shadows and into the 
mainstream world of Egyptian politics and society at large.186   
This is a clear example of the Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution from an outcast 
Islamist movement to a savvy political organization that recognized the necessity and 
utility of compromising and pacting with the opposition in furtherance of legitimacy and 
the opportunity to achieve long-term policy goals. Of particular importance is the fact 
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that the Wafd Party had historically self-identified “itself as a secular nationalist party 
that rejected the mixing of religion and politics, and since 1924 this had created 
animosity between the Wafd and the Muslim Brothers.”187  The simple fact that the 
Muslim Brotherhood would chose to advance forward into the political arena allied with 
a secularist political organization speaks volumes about the extent to which the 
Brotherhood had evolved as an organization. Ultimately their strategy of compromise and 
pacting proved to be successful as the unlikely alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the New Wafd Party ultimately election of a total of 58 seats within parliament with 
eight belonging to the Brotherhood outright.188  Defying the expectations of critics, the 
Brotherhood’s performance in parliament continued to exhibit a compromising and 
progressive approach that shied away from divisive religiosity and focused on the 
pressing more immediately pressing socio-economic issues affecting their respective 
constituencies.189   
B. DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE  
Another consideration that is germane to the discussion of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s democratic capacity is the central controlled organizational structure. The 
Brotherhood is “loosely structured on Egypt’s national Boy Scout movement, beginning 
with neighborhood ‘families’ of five members and ascending in scope to local, regional 
and provincial-level affiliates.”190  In contrast to most of the contemporary political 
organizations within Egypt that are comparatively far less difficult to join in terms of 
becoming a participating member, “becoming a full-fledged Muslim Brother is a five-to-
eight-year process, during which aspiring members are closely watched for their loyalty 
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to the cause and are indoctrinated in the Brotherhood’s curriculum.”191  The lengthy 
vetting process for membership is complimented by a highly complex and tightly 
controlled recruiting and promotion process that ensures those who become members of 
the Brotherhood are fully devoted to the society’s organizational goals.192  For an 
organization that was essentially targeted as threat to the regime for decades with its 
leadership imprisoned and its very existence criminalized, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
organizational structure provided a foundation of strength and patience that enabled it to 
survive in a highly hostile environment. Indeed, the formalization of the recruitment 
process “became an important tool for ensuring that the state security services could not 
infiltrate the organization, which is precisely what happened to most other opposition 
groups and parties under President Anwar al-Sadat and Mubarak.”193 
At the helm of the Brotherhood is the Supreme Guide who leads the 15 member 
Guidance Office. The Guidance Office is organized by functional area with each member 
responsible for a specific area of Brotherhood activities. The Guidance Office leadership 
is selected by the Shura Council, a secondary level of Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
that is comprised of about 100 senior members of the society.194  The Shura Council 
leadership is responsible for debating important issues and deciding a course of action 
that will then be passed on to the Guidance Office for execution.195  The execution of the 
Shura Council’s agenda is then carried out as “[o]rders are passed down through a chain 
of command: the Guidance Office calls its deputies in each regional sector, who call their 
deputies in each subsidiary populace, who call the heads of each local usra, who then 
transmit the order to their members.”196 
                                                 
191 Eric Trager, “The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, Issue 5, 









This level of centralized command and control provides the Muslim Brotherhood 
leadership with an extremely secure line of communication with its membership. This 
pyramid shaped organizational flow chart, along with the strictly enforced recruitment 
and vetting process, largely accounts for the Muslim Brotherhood’s institutional strength, 
patience, and ability to create and mobilize a devout following of members. However, 
while this organizational structure is well built to withstand attacks from authoritarian 
regimes, it is arguably less capable of participating in a democracy. In a democratic 
system of government, a political party cannot expect to successfully participate with a 
“winner takes all” approach to policy making. Consequently, democracies reward 
political parties that are flexible and agile enough adapt to a fluid environment and 
compromise with the opposition. The most significant national political issues facing the 
Egyptian government, such as the economy, the reinstitution of parliament, and the 
drafting of the new constitution require immediate attention and action. Such political 
issues are highly time sensitive and stalwart patience and resolve will not be enough to 
solve these complex problems. In essence, the very characteristics that enabled the 
Muslim Brotherhood to survive years of persecution are the same characteristics that may 
hinder its ability to participate efficiently and effectively within a democratic system. The 
Brotherhood’s patient and strict adherence to rigid policy goals may be simply too slow, 
inflexible, and unresponsive for Egyptian politics within the new democracy.  
Additionally, given the rigid stricture described above along with the strict 
ideological agenda that is seeking the singular and uncompromising end-state of an 
Islamic state, simple logic seems to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from sincerely and 
genuinely adopting democracy as a long term political framework from which to advance 
their policy goals. In order to do so, the Muslim Brotherhood would necessarily have to 
negotiate and compromise with political opponents that have completely disparate visions 
for the foundation of Egypt’s government. While competing interests are present in any 
political system, for an organization to participate in a democracy it must be able to 
negotiate and compromise with adversaries without the expectation of a total victory or 
capitulation. In the case, of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is arguably no end-state but 
total victory if that end-state means that Egypt becomes an Islamic state. In essence, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood’s DNA is inherently undemocratic because its entire purpose and 
mission is in furtherance of a goal that does not allow any room for compromise with 
those that are opposing that same goal. 
C. FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY—POLITICAL MANEUVERING OF 
THE MORSI ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 
An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological development has 
revealed significant support for the proposition that movement has shown an inclination 
for pragmatic and progressive participation within a democratic system to include the 
demonstrated willingness to negotiate, compromise, and pact with political opponents in 
furtherance of a long term political strategy. Today this long term strategy includes full 
participation in party politics with the inception of the FJP because “[f]or the first time 
ever, the Muslim Brotherhood has formed a political party that is theoretically ‘separate’ 
from the group, although it remains a part of it in practical terms.”197  The two 
organizations remain very closely tied with all of the leadership having been selected 
from the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council.198  However, there is at least a modicum of 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Brotherhood’s long term political strategy in 
one that is inclusive and sympathetic to the forming of pacts with rivals. For example, the 
founding members of the FJP totaled just over 9000, of which a third were non-
Brotherhood members and included within its ranks Coptic Christians as well.199  
Additionally, in an apparent attempt to create the impression that the FJP will attain a 
degree of independence and impartiality, the society “has asked movement leaders who 
take a prominent political role to step down form their Brotherhood positions.”200  
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This is significant because since the Presidential Election of 2012, the 
Brotherhood, via its political surrogate, the FJP, has enjoyed its strongest position in 
terms of leverage and political power since inception. It would seem fairly predictable, 
after suffering nearly 80 years of persecution by one authoritarian regime after another, 
that the Brotherhood would be inclined to take immediate bold policy changes given their 
mandate by the Egyptian people. However, the opposite appears to be the case, and in 
keeping with the institutional patience cultivated during decades of imprisonment and 
political marginalization, the Brotherhood has made slow and deliberate moves on the 
political chess board since President Morsi took office. While Morsi has been criticized 
by some for his rather measured moves, his subjugation of the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) was a comparatively shocking display of the new elected 
President’s executive powers. Yet this step was also a crucial step in furtherance of 
Egypt’s democratic transition. In situations such as the one Egypt currently faces, where 
the military represents an enormous institution of both political and economic might and 
has historically enjoyed virtually unfettered access to the political decision making 
process, a newly democratic government can find itself in an untenable position.201  In 
order to effect a meaningful transition to democracy, the key initial challenge for Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood was to establish civilian control over the Egyptian military. 
Under normal circumstances, such an endeavor is a “complex and typically protracted 
process, requiring… skilled political leadership, unity among civilian political forces 
(across partisan and other divides), civilian expertise (both inside and outside 
government) on national security matters, and luck (in the form of divisions within the 
military, and military rebellions too partial and inept to succeed).”202   
However, the circumstances within Egypt following the fall of Mubarak were 
hardly ordinary regarding the relative position of power enjoyed by the military. The 
Egyptian military commands a very large interest within the national economy. Although 
the Egyptian Trade Ministry recently provided that the military controls about 10 percent 
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of the economy, “Amr Hamzawy, a former research director for the Carnegie Middle 
East Center recently elected to the new Egyptian Parliament, pegged the military’s 
economic activity at up to 30 percent of Egypt’s total economy, or about $60 billion.”203  
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Egyptian military and its economic 
activities have been nearly free from civilian control since the 1979 enactment of “Law 
32” which essentially granted it complete independence from the any governmental 
budgetary oversight and provided the military the ability to maintain a private 
commercial bank account.204  This is led to the military’s transformation into an 
economic juggernaut as “profits from the military’s economic activities were returned to 
its own coffers, making it impossible for Egyptians or civilian government officials to 
have meaningful input on budget priorities or oversight of expenditures.” 205   
While the military’s control over the Egyptian civilian government has been 
minimized by President Morsi’s recent political maneuvering, the military’s leadership 
clearly maintains a desire to remain independent from civilian budgetary control.206  
Specifically, “it wants to ensure that it preserves control of U.S. military assistance ($1.3 
billion annually) and does not have to make public the details of the military budget… 
[while ensuring] that its extensive business interests are not investigated or limited.”207  
While the scale of the military’s economic empire is unknown, its enormity is without 
question considering “the army was able to afford to give the Central Bank of Egypt $1 
billion to boost its dwindling foreign exchange reserves in 2011.”208   
Additionally, the Egyptian civilian economic sector has become saturated with, 
and dominated by, its retired officers and can accurately be ascribed “par excellence a 
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republic of retired generals.”209  In what can only be characterized as an institutional 
system of patronage, the retiring Egyptian general officer can expect to be appointed to 
any one of many high paying civilian positions such as governor, factory manager, or 
director of a public works facility.210  Consequently, this has created “the ‘officers’ 
republic,’ the self-perpetuating military networks that permeate virtually all branches and 
levels of state administration and of the state-owned sectors of the economy.”211  This 
“officers’ republic” must be dismantled for there to be any hope of civilian control over 
the Egyptian military. Unfortunately, given the economic entrenchment of the military, 
separating the generals from politics will not be quick or easy. This fact was made 
abundantly clear during a July 2012 visit by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, the 
former leader of the SCAF, Field Marshall Tantawi stated that “Egypt will not fall… it is 
for all Egyptians, not for a certain group—the armed forces will not allow that.”212  
Tantawi’s statement was clearly understood by all as a reassurance to the secularists that 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist agenda would not be carried out unchecked. In 
essence, “many secular and Christian Egyptians, even some who participated in the 
revolution, have come to see the military as a guarantor against Islamist excess, a role the 
military has claimed for itself.”213 
Given the aura of invincibility and almost limitless power over the Egyptian state 
since the fall of Mubarak, it was an incredible turn of events when on August 12 
President Morsi announced that the head of the SCAF and minister of Defense, Field 
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Marshall Hussein Tantawi, would be retiring and replaced by General Abdel Fatah Said 
El Sissy. Additionally, Morsi retired and replaced another senior member of the SCAF 
and the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sami Annan. Morsi would also rescind the 
“SCAF’s June 17 addendum to the constitutional declaration, thus reacquiring full 
presidential powers.”214  This move by Morsi was a critical first step in returning the 
Egyptian Army back to the barracks. Moreover, while it may not have represented what 
O’Donnell and Schmitter would call “The Military Moment,” there are some helpful 
similarities with this paradigm and the current state of the Egyptian civil-military 
relationship.215  Essentially, this is the moment in a democratic transition whereby the 
new civilian leadership pacts with the military establishment that has, up until this point, 
maintained the daily functions of government on behalf of the state. The common 
elements of such a pact are that “in exchange for… tolerating some civic contestation 
over policy, the leader obtains an agreement from notables and/or moderate opponents 
that they will neither resort to disruption or violence, nor press too insistently or 
immediately their claim to govern, nor seek sanctions against military officers for 
“excesses” committed under the… authoritarian regime.”216  Indeed, circumstantial 
evidence seems to suggest that President Morsi and the Brotherhood have engaged in just 
such a negotiated settlement with the Egyptian military’s leadership. Yet, distinguished 
from O’Donnell and Schmitter’s “Military Moment” where the military establishment 
essentially turns the keys of the government over to the new civilian authority, the 
Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood appear to have negotiated more of a 
gentleman’s agreement to partition the state between them.   
Two factors weigh heavily in favor of this conclusion. First is the inexplicable 
change of tone by the SCAF which, only months before, was the self-declared defender 
of the state against the encroachment of Islamists. It is well documented that Field 
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Marshall Tantawi and the military have been uncompromising political foes of the 
Muslim Brotherhood during the post-revolution transition. Given this fact, what it is 
remarkable is the lack of comment or response by the SCAF or the military’s leadership 
immediately following Morsi’s power grab. This would suggest that the SCAF was 
involved in a negotiated withdrawal from the political stage.   
The second factor that seems to indicate that there was some level of negotiated 
pact was the fact that the military leadership has faced negative public criticism from the 
Egyptian public for their heavy hand toward civilian protestors during the revolution and 
after the fall of Mubarak. Reports of “virginity tests” committed by the military police 
against female protestors and the excessive use of force against civilians have tarnished a 
once highly regarded Egyptian institution. Additionally, Field Marshall Tantawi is a 
remnant of the Mubarak regime and has prospered significantly due to real-estate 
investments and other commercial ventures that are closely tied to the military sector. 
Yet, with all of these potentially damning threads to pull notwithstanding, President 
Morsi honored the retiring Field Marshall and his General’s with the Egypt’s highest 
military honors at their retirement and has showed no interest in investigating or 
prosecuting any senior members of the Egyptian military for violations of human rights 
committed during the Mubarak regime. The events surrounding President Morsi’s 
subjugation of the SCAF overwhelmingly suggest that there was indeed a negotiated pact 
between the most senior leadership of the military and the Muslim Brotherhood whereby 
there would be a peaceful transfer of executive authority in return for amnesty. 
Morsi’s bold bargain with the SCAF has been well received as a step in the right 
direction in terms moving the Egyptian civil-military relationship closer to what would be 
expected in a democracy. However, it may also be problematic for Egypt’s long-term 
prospects for democratic consolidation if the bargain is in fact a negotiated partition of 
the state between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military establishment. Such an 
agreement is challenging because while it normalizes the civil-military relationship it 
would also, by default, create what is essentially territory within Egypt that is ungoverned 
by the democratically elected government. This is particularly important in Egypt’s case 
because the military is more than just a security force. It represents a cornerstone of the 
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Egyptian political economy. Given the current state of the economy, this fact makes the 
military’s half of the partition an extremely powerful and influential “ungoverned” piece 
of political real-estate. Therefore, the partition agreement may actually prove to be “one 
step forward, one step backwards” with respect Egypt’s transition to democracy. 
In addition to President Morsi’s removal of the SCAF, an examination of Morsi’s 
prime minister and cabinet selections may appear to be inclusive at the outset. Yet, at the 
same time there is a compelling argument to be made that Morsi’s attempts to appear 
pluralistic were insincere and made without any intention of genuine power sharing with 
the opposition. Morsi’s selection of Hesham Kandil as Egypt’s prime minister was seen 
by some as a weak choice given his inexperience in the area of Egypt’s most pressing 
national concern—the anemic economy. As a U.S. educated irrigation and water 
resources management expert, Kandil was a surprising choice for many Egyptians given 
that he had little name recognition.217  And although Kandil has never been a member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, he will be the first bearded Prime Minister in Egypt’s history 
which is a clear indication of his strong Islamic faith and may suggest that he would be 
highly sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda.218  The most likely conclusion 
to be drawn about Morsi’s selection of Kandil is that he was chosen because he would be 
unlikely to challenge the President or the Muslim Brotherhood’s political agenda.219   
As far as the rest of Morsi’s cabinet is concerned, it may be difficult on paper to 
make the accusation that the Muslim Brotherhood overreached in that there were only 
four Muslim Brothers appointed to fill the 35 positions available. Moreover, the exact 
composition of the new Egyptian cabinet “includes 29 technocrats (seven of whom 
served under El-Ganzouri), four ministers from the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party, one minister from the moderate Islamist Al-Wasat Party, and one from the 
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Salafist Al-Nahda Party.”220  However, there are legitimate concerns regarding the 
technocrat heavy cabinet as articulated by “Egyptian liberal thinker and head of the Ibn 
Khaldun Center for Development Studies, Saad Eddin Ibrahim [who] said that though 
most ministers of the newly formed cabinet are not part of Islamist movements, they are, 
still, representatives of a pro-Islamism current.”221  Criticism notwithstanding, there is no 
denying that “Morsi assembled a cabinet that is more technocratic than ideological and 
has thus far used its authority to issue decrees sparingly.”222  Yet, while used sparingly, 
Morsi’s most recent decree to deny judicial review of the either the President or the 
Constituent Assembly is highly suggestive of the Muslim Brotherhood true ambition to 
“game-the-game” and push through a pro-Islamic constitution given that nearly all of the 
non-Islamic and secularist members of the Constituent Assembly have resigned or 
abstained in protest.   
Another process that has received significant attention since President Morsi was 
elected has been the highly politicized Constituent Assembly. Charged with drafting 
Egypt’s new constitution, the Constituent assembly has had tumultuous short history. 
Elected by parliament, the First Constituent Assembly was found to be unconstitutional 
by the Egyptian Supreme Court on the basis that parliament had essentially elected 
themselves to serve on the panel as members. While it has been reformed and continues 
to work on drafting the new constitution, critics have voiced dissent over the composition 
of the Assembly as it was seen by many as overrepresented by Islamists with the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s FJP making up a majority of the membership. The result of this criticism 
has been that nearly all of the non-Islamist members of the Assembly have recused 
themselves from the process altogether. Given this simple fact, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Islamists have been rightly accused of “dominating the process and are likely to 
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see a constitution that reflects their interests.”223  However, the Brotherhood and the FJP 
have countered their critics with the assertion that they have not overreached during 
regarding the draft constitution.224  There is some support for the Islamists position as to 
date they have only pressed for “limited and subtle textual changes in religion-state 
relations compared to the 1971 constitution [and]…the issues on which there has been 
most controversy, such as explicit mentions of the Islamic sharia, changes will be 
particularly light.”225 
Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly has also been hindered by the polarization 
of the multitude of competing interests that have imparted their influence on the process. 
While a constitution is supposed to provide the authority to govern, they are most 
effectively written by the governed through an assembly of representatives elected to 
perform this task on their behalf.226  The problem facing Egypt is that in their case 
“political authorities are helping draft the constitution from which they will draw their 
own future authority.”227  This dynamic has created the situation whereby very powerful 
institutions of the state, now unencumbered by a repressive regime, have become 
intimately involved in the process.228  The methods of participation vary as “[s]ome such 
bodies (such as al-Azhar) have formal representatives in the Constituent Assembly, but 
others make their voices heard by directly negotiating with assembly leaders, airing their 
opinions in the press, issuing statements, and even suggesting that they might resort to 
strikes or demonstrations.”229..Essentially these institutions are fighting for the 
sovereignty protected by the constitution to conduct their respective business without 
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external interference. More specifically, they want “to know that they will be able to 
govern their own affairs, make their own judgments, appoint their own members, select 
their own leaders, and spend their budgets freed of the heavy hand of presidential control 
that weighed so much on them in the past.”230 
Notwithstanding personality conflicts such as the ones by the recent and public 
rifts between President Morsi and political opponents such as the Prosecutor General Abd 
al-Magid Mahmud and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court, in practice 
the FJP has been highly attentive in closing the distance with such important 
institutions.231  In such cases where the FJP has met resistance from such opponents, the 
Brotherhood’s institutional patience may rely on the passage of time and “hope that over 
the long term these institutions might gradually pass into more genial hands.”232  
Furthermore, compromises between the Muslim Brothers and these state institutions may 
be readily foreseeable given that the recent political and electoral victories.233  The 
Brotherhood and the FJP may likely consider these political compromises well worth the 
end-state of a new Egyptian constitution drafted by a Islamist leaning Assembly.234 
D. SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 
In summary, upon an examination of the Muslim Brotherhood’s history with 
respect the development of an identifiable political ideology, as well as the more recent 
political maneuvering of the Brotherhood’s FJP that has occurred since the election of 
President Morsi, there are several objective conclusions that can be drawn with respect to 
the society’s capacity to enable a democratic transition within Egypt. The first objective 
conclusion is that the Muslim Brotherhood has developed a political ideology that, highly 
consistent with democratic governance. Without question, over the course of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s history, due largely to the influence of Qutb’s writings, there have been 
                                                 






periods punctuated by the use violence as a means of political expression. However, al-
Hudaybi was instrumental in disavowing the Muslim Brotherhood from violent protest 
and a more accommodating and progressive approach that was far more consistent with 
al-Banna’s original vision for the society as a political movement. The key take away 
from this examination of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political lineage is that, over time, 
the organization has objectively proven through its action to have the capacity to 
compromise and pact with political opponents in furtherance of long term policy goals.   
Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the FJP, have clearly 
demonstrated a capacity for democratic governance. In a very short time frame, President 
Morsi has made the critical first step in Egypt’s democratic transition by subjugating the 
SCAF and securing the civilian control over the government. Although the Egyptian 
military industrial complex remains an extremely powerful political force due to its 
ubiquitous relationship with the national economy, President Morsi’s bold moves to 
replace the old guard of the military leadership bolds well for the development of civil-
military relations that are in keeping with democratic ideals. Additionally, given the lack 
of protest of any kind by the SCAF or other senior military leaders, there appear to be 
very strong indications that the Muslim Brotherhood and the military negotiated a pact 
prior to the public replacement of Field Marshall Tantawi and other top level general 
officers and security services leadership. Finally, with regard to the selection of the new 
Egyptian prime minister and cabinet, Morsi has faces some criticism from rivals who 
have suggested that the relatively unknown Kandil and the technocrat heavy cabinet is a 
clear attempt by the Brotherhood to pack the government with weak Islamist leaning 
pawns. However, that criticism appears to be a bit misplaced given the fact that the FJP 
has been willing to include rivals within the cabinet and other high level government 
appointments. In consideration of the foregoing, “[t]hus far, the Brotherhood can hardly 
be accused of throwing its weight around” and has objectively demonstrated an modest 
level of democratic capacity.235 
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IV. SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS—MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S 
DEMOCRATIC INTENTIONS AS PERCEIVED BY THE EGYTPIAN 
POLITY SINCE THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The fourth chapter of this thesis will attempt to distinguish the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s democratic intentions via subjective analysis. The intention is to examine 
the reactions to the Muslim Brotherhood’s and the FJP’s political activities by the key 
political stakeholders within the Egyptian polity over the last 18 months. This data set has 
been collected from print and Internet news sources covering the political relationship 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and these key stakeholders in order to get a subjective 
sense of the Brotherhood’s perceived penchant for democracy. These sources will 
provide the basis for the anecdotal subjective evidence of the perception of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s willingness to share power, compromise, and participate in “pacting” with 
the elite of Egyptian politics. Given the lack of first hand access to the leadership of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, a comprehensive review of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
inclusiveness as perceived by these key stakeholders will provide subjective evidence to 
fill in this gap of understanding regarding their democratic intentions. 
The following groups have been selected as a barometer of the democracy within 
Egypt because of their respective significance and because, taken together, they will 
capture a comprehensive and complete perception of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
military establishment represents an extremely powerful piece of the political landscape 
and the quality and scope of the evolving civil-military relationship is important to fully 
understand the potential for Egypt’s democratic transition. The Salafis, Secularists, and 
Copts represent three groups within the electorate that are important because they are, for 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the source for one of the most polarizing issues within Egyptian 
politics, the Islamization of the state. Therefore, the perception of each of these political 
groups is valuable evidence in terms of the Brotherhood’s democratic capacity. The 
Media, Judiciary, and Labor Unions have been included for the fact that each of these 
groups personifies a key element of democracy. The Media is crucial because its views 
on the Muslim Brotherhood will be a key indication of transparency and the free flow of 
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information from the government to the electorate. The judiciary is the custodian of the 
rule of law—what could be considered the life-blood of a democracy. And the Labor 
Unions (while the dire state of the economy is certainly related to the Union’s importance 
to this study) need to be examined because of they can only exist if the government 
permits and protects the fundamentally democratic liberty to freely associate. Finally, 
throughout the world, and especially within the MENA, woman’s rights have been an 
area of human rights law that has been problematic for many nations. Furthermore, 
democratic governance has been a champion for the advancement of woman’s rights. 
Therefore, the perception of woman’s rights organizations within Egypt is critically 
important to assess the inclusiveness and acceptance of what the modern democracies 
have deemed as a basic human right. 
A. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT’S PERCEPTION  
As previously discussed, the Egyptian military complex is an immeasurably large 
force within the nation’s polity given its control of such a large percentage of the state’s 
economy. Additionally, the military was the self-appointed guardian of the state 
following the fall of Hosni Mubarak with the SCAF assuming plenary powers over the 
government. Any examination of the Egyptian transition to democracy should begin with 
a discussion of the perception of the civil-military relationship between the newly elected 
President Morsi and the leadership of the Egyptian security forces. To that end, the most 
significant event that has transpired since the presidential election is, without question, 
the retirement and replacement of the senior military leadership. And, as the preceding 
chapter illuminated, there are measurable objective indications that the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the FJP have the will and the capacity to make the necessary changes to 
establish a civil-military relationship that is in keeping with democratic ideals and 
governance. The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the subjective evidence 
relative to the military establishment’s perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity 
to effect a democratic transition. In this case, the identification of such a perception is 
made more difficult given the notoriously secretive Egyptian military that has a long 
history of tightly controlling the outflow of information.   
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That fact notwithstanding, subjective determinations can often be deciphered from 
silence just as clearly as they can be learned from what is actually said. In the case at 
hand, this might very well be true as the military leadership’s silence may be quite 
meaningful. The SCAF had been a vocal and politically active opponent of the Muslim 
Brotherhood prior to the Presidential election. And Field Marshall Tantawi defiantly 
claimed in thinly veiled language that the military would be the defender of the state 
against Islamist forces. Within Egypt, and the international community at large, there was 
a clear understanding that, although the FJP may have won the presidential election, the 
country was still very much held within the grasp of the SCAF.   
Then the most unexpected thing occurred virtually without warning. On Sunday 
August 12th, 2012 President Morsi “ordered the powerful head of the army and defence 
minister, Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, and several senior generals into retirement and 
canceled constitutional amendments issued by the military restricting presidential 
powers.”236  The move was a bold power grab by President Morsi whose executive 
powers had been significantly reduced by the SCAF prior to him swearing into office on 
June 30th. Before that point in time there were some doubts as to how much influence 
and authority the newly elected president and the FJP would be able to wield within the 
government given the SCAF’s publicly defiant posture toward the President and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
Nevertheless, President Morsi and the FJP were able to very skillfully and 
tactfully remove the leadership of the SCAF and establish the President as the civilian 
leader of the both the Egyptian government and the Egyptian armed forces. While the 
public response to this event has been overwhelmingly positive and vocal, the military 
and the SCAF have been deathly silent in response to Morsi’s shake-up of the military. 
The clear conclusion being drawn is that, at a minimum, this silence indicates consent. 
Indeed, “[p]olitical and military experts say that Morsy’s radical decision to cast aside 
Tantawi and Anan, who remained on top of the military institution for decades, indicates 
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that the president is consolidating his power over the military establishment in a tactful 
manner, without necessarily ending the legacy of the military state.”237  This is necessary 
a move in the right direction with regard to Egypt’s transition to democracy because the 
“military is now serving as an instrument for the Muslim Brotherhood... [a]nd Morsy’s 
move institutionalizes normal civilian control over the military.”238   
From a subjective standpoint, the silent response is instructive of the both the 
SCAF’s and the military establishment’s perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
FJP because it strongly suggests that there was a deal brokered prior to the Morsy’s 
reshuffling of the military leadership. Indeed, “Morsy had to first guarantee authority 
over the Presidential Guard and Central Security Forces to defend the president against 
any street riots that might take place as a reaction to the military leaders shuffle.”239  To 
do this it appears highly probable that President Morsy has at least the tacit support of the 
mid-level leadership within the Egyptian military’s officer corps.   
As a general rule, the Egyptian military is extremely close-hold when it comes to 
its inner workings and dealings, so any subjective analysis of the military’s perception of 
the Brotherhood as an institution will necessarily be gleaned from circumstantial 
evidence. With this in mind, the local reports strongly suggest that there was in fact some 
negotiated pact given that many believe that “[i]n his purge of Egypt’s top general’s, 
President Mohamed Morsi leaned on the support of a junior officer corps that blamed the 
old guard for a litany of problems within the military and for involving the armed forces 
too deeply in the country’s politics after the uprising that ousted… Hosni Mubarak.”240   
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This presumption is further corroborated by the fact that on the following “Monday, a 
day after the generals’ ouster, there were no signs that the military was mobilizing in 
protest.”241   
These events and the military’s silence in response have led to the conclusion by 
many analysts “that the president had reached an accommodation with a new generation 
of military leaders who were seeking to restore the armed forces’ credibility, enhancing 
their own positions, and preserve the military’s privileged and protected place in 
society.”242  Further support for this conclusion is found in the observations of 
Democracy Now! correspondent Sharif Abdel Kouddous who opined that Morsi’s move 
was “really a personnel reshuffle, a major personnel reshuffle, within the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, rather than any major transformative institutional change 
that has taken place, and it’s really a reconfiguration of the relationship between the army 
and the president, whereby it seems the military has protected its vast economic and 
business interests.”243   
While the subjective evidence presented does support the conclusion that 
President Morsi has presumable normalized the civil-military relationship in a way that is 
more consistent with democratic ideals, the method in which it was achieved may be 
problematic for Egypt’s long-term democratic prospects. This is because the subjugation 
of the military appears to have been accomplished via a negotiated partition that, as 
previously discussed, allows the military to maintain control over its vast industrial 
complex which accounts for a significant portion of the fragile Egyptian economy. This 
partition agreement may be a double edged sword for Egypt’s democratic transition 
because, while it served to legitimize Morsi’s presidential power and authority over the 
government, it simultaneously carves out a significant portion of “political-economic 
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territory” that remains firmly within the military’s control. Finally, while there is some 
risk of a negative reaction from within the officer corps to President Morsi’s decree of 
November 22, 2012, that risk is minimal due to the fact that the new constitution protects 
the military industrial complex partition and their expansive commercial empire. 
B. SALAFIS’ PERCEPTION  
The term Salafism references a highly conservative form of Islam that wishes to 
return the Islamic faith to the form in which it is believed to have been practiced during 
the time of Muhammad.244  Traditionally, the Salafis have not been an active or 
meaningful political institution within Egyptian politics. Under the Mubarak regime, the 
Salafis were reticent to engage in political activism due to religious beliefs that held such 
behavior to be haram or forbidden.245  Relying on classical Sunni texts that preached 
political quietism, the Salafis adhered to the proposition that “Muslims must not rebel 
against their ruler no matter how unjust or impious he is, and the Muslim masses have no 
rights to political participation.”246   
However, much has changed since the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Salafis are no 
exception. Indeed, “the spectrum of political Islam in Egypt is no longer limited to the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the parties that derived from it, such as the Brotherhood’s 
official Freedom and Justice Party and the Wasat Party… [;] it now includes several 
conservative Salafi parties, of which the al-Nour is by far the most prominent.”247  
Although the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed significant success in Egypt’s most recent 
parliamentary contest, the election also showcased a new more politically active 
undercurrent within Salafism as the al-Nour Party was elected to over 30 seats.248   
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While the Muslim Brotherhood and the more progressive Salafism of today’s 
Egypt are both Islamist organizations, “these Islamically motivated organizations have 
different approaches and beliefs and are taking distinctly divergent positions.”249  These 
differences have led to the development of a somewhat strained relationship between the 
two organizations. Due to the natural overlap of Islamic values, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Salafis have made limited attempts to leverage the unity of Islam and share 
resources where possible.250  However, there is still a significant distinction between the 
two organizations as “the Brotherhood has a pragmatic streak that makes it an unlikely 
ally for Salafis who only recently ventured from preaching into politics and whose strict 
ideology offers little scope for compromise.”251  A senior leader of the Salafis, Sheikh 
Mohammed Farahat, succinctly proffered their differences, stating that “The Ikhwan 
tends to maneuver politically, while we follow scripture literally.”252  Moreover, the 
leader of the al-Nour party, Emad Abdel Ghaffour, has also spoken out about the 
relationship between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood and stated in plain terms that 
the Salafis would not be subservient to the Brotherhood’s agenda.253  In a recent 
interview, Ghaffour explained that “we hate being followers… they always say we take 
positions according to the Brotherhood but we have our own vision… There might be a 
consensus but… we will remain independent.”254 
Most recently, the Salafis have been vocal critics of the Constituent Assembly and 
the process of drafting of Egypt’s new constitution. Holding a hard line with regard to the 
wording of certain provisions, Salafist leaders have appeared uncompromising in regard 
to their position on the inclusion of Sharia Law as the constitution’s guiding principle. 
Recently the senior member of the Salafist Asala Party, “Adel Afify said that there are 
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several issues with the current draft of the constitution that are unacceptable, such as the 
wording of Article 2, which states that ‘Islam is the state religion, its official language 
Arabic and the principles of Islamic Shari’a are the main source of legislation.”255  The 
position of Afify and the Salafis is that Article 2 must “stipulate that the ‘provisions’ of 
Islamic law, rather than the ‘principles’ of Islamic law, are the primary source of 
legislation.”256  This is a major source of contention and a position that is not shared by a 
many of the Islamists within the FJP. The exact wording of the new constitution is largely 
going to be determined by how effectively the Muslim Brotherhood can close the 
ideological and theocratic gap between the Salafis and their secularist opponents.257 
Any assessment of the Salafis perception of the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood 
must consider the fact that the “relationship between Egypt’s Salafis and the more 
moderate Brotherhood has always vacillated between periods of reluctant cooperation 
and friction… [and these] two ‘frenemies’ share the long-term objective of establishing 
an Islamic state, but they disagree on the timeframe and tactics for achieving that 
goal.”258  While the Brotherhood’s political strategy has included a slower and more 
compromising approach that has been comparatively more willing to negotiate with 
secularist opponents, “Salafis, meanwhile, have accused the Brotherhood of backstabbing 
and dragging their feet on the application of sharia.”259   
Consequently, the analysis of the Salafis’ perception of the Brotherhood, in terms 
assessing their democratic capacity, is a complex question. Subjectively, the Salafis 
arguably perceive the Muslim Brotherhood as unwilling to advance the Salafis’ ultra-
conservative Islamist agenda. However, the Muslim Brotherhood is essentially drawing 
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criticism from the Salafis because, since Morsi’s election, they have pragmatically 
attempted to find common ground with the Salafis’ political opposition. On face value, 
this perception appears to support the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
unwilling to negotiate and compromise with their fellow, yet more conservative, 
Islamists. However, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has received such strong 
criticism would also seem to indicate that the Brotherhood has made pluralistic and 
inclusive overtures to members of the Egyptian polity such as the Secularist’s who 
oppose the Salafis’ agenda.  
C. SECULARISTS’ PERCEPTION  
Whatever solidarity was shared between secular Egyptians and the Muslim 
Brotherhood appears to have waned since they joined together at Tahrir Square in protest 
of Hosni Mubarak’s regime during the outset of the January 25th Revolution. There are 
several reasons for the growing distance between these two political groups. First there is 
a mounting level of distrust between the two groups that was publicly articulated 
following the Muslim Brotherhood’s rescinding of their pledge to abstain from running a 
candidate for President in 2011. The Brotherhood’s political ambition has prompted 
accusations by Egyptian secularists that the society is “seeking to monopolize power after 
the Islamist group reversed course and nominated a candidate for the presidential 
vote.”260  In a statement via e-mail, Ahmed Saeed, a leading secularist and head of the 
Free Egyptians Party disclosed that the Muslim Brotherhood’s announcement of Khairat 
el-Shater nomination was expected “after the Brotherhood indicated that it would ‘follow 
in the footsteps’ of the former ruling National Democratic Party in seeking to control 
decision-making.”261  The decision to put a candidate in the race for the Presidential 
office appears to have created a perception within secularist groups that the Muslim 
Brotherhood is moving to dominate the entire political spectrum. According to former 
Presidential candidate Amre Moussa who served as Mubarak’s Arab League head, “a win 
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by el-Shater, coupled with the Brotherhood’s dominance in parliament and on the 
committee charged with drafting the country’s new constitution, would make it seem as 
though ‘the revolution had never happened.’”262   
This theme of secular distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic intentions 
continued to grow after the election of President Morsi in June of 2012. While there was 
wide agreement and praise within Egypt and the international community following 
President Morsi’s removal of the SCAF leadership and asserting the primacy of civilian 
rule over the powerful Egyptian military (a necessary condition for any meaningful 
transition to democracy), the positive perception of the Muslim Brotherhood has failed to 
gain traction with secular Egyptians. Shortly after Morsi retired Field Marshal Tantawi, 
former International Atomic Energy Agency director, and Egyptian secularist, Mohamed 
ElBaradei tweeted that “ending military rule is a step in the right direction[,]… 
[h]owever, he added that Morsy’s reclamation of legislative as well of executive powers 
form the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces should be temporary, saying that it 
would otherwise be at odds with the essence of democracy.”263  According to head of 
foreign affairs for the secularist Social Democrat Party, Hussein Gohar, “the presidential 
election was wakeup call to a lot of the players… [and] [p]eople panicked after Morsy 
became president and they’re still panicking.”264  
Most recently, Morsi has faced strong public disapproval due to his Presidential 
Decree of November 22, 2012. Secularists are stridently protesting in opposition to the 
President’s most recent executive decision. In what has been self-justified as an effort to 
ensure the successful drafting of a new constitution by the highly flawed and criticized 
Constituent Assembly, President Morsi has granted “himself sweeping powers and 
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immunity from judicial challenges over any laws he may pass until a new parliament is 
elected and a constitution is in place.”265  Additionally, President Morsi’s decree 
extended immunity to the constituent assembly (the membership of which is heavily 
represented by Salafi and FJP Islamists) and sacked Egypt’s general prosecutor.266  
While President Morsi claims his decree was only intended to cement the foundation of 
democracy by enabling the Constituent Assembly the freedom to finish drafting Egypt’s 
constitution, secularists are clearly unnerved. Across Egypt the decree has been received 
as a “tightening of Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood party’s grip on power has been 
broadly condemned.”267  Mohamed ElBaradei responded to the President’s new powers 
by tweeting that “Morsi today usurped all state powers [and] appointed himself Egypt’s 
new pharaoh[;]…[a] major blow to the revolution that could have dire consequences.”268 
Although President Morsi has publicly stated that his decree is limited in its 
duration, lasting only until a new parliament and constitution are in place, the decree 
itself has been perceived by secularists as a highly problematic consolidation of power. 
Given the secularist reaction to President Morsi’s political maneuvers over the past 18 
months, it is abundantly clear that the current perception is that the Muslim Brotherhood 
does not have inclusive and pluralistic democratic intentions with regard to the 
governance of Egypt. 
D. COPTS’ PERCEPTION  
As the largest minority religious demographic within Egypt, the Coptic Christian 
Church represents only 10 percent of the population within the predominately Muslim 
state. Objectively, this fact alone would seem to be enough to raise concerns after the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate won the Presidential election in June of 2012. Indeed, 
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such reasonable and foreseeable concerns were manifested as “Egypt’s Coptic Christians 
met the recent assumption of the presidency by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed 
Morsi with trepidation, even panic—some even made plans to leave the country.”269   
However, some members of the Coptic community initially opined that such 
panic was premature and unwarranted given President Morsi’s record during the first few 
months of his administration. A Coptic expert and editor of Al-Watan, a Christian 
periodical recently commented that “Copts were mortified when Morsi won. It was as if 
the sky had fallen,…[b]ut such fears appear to be overblown. Since assuming the 
presidency, Morsi hasn’t done anything—at least until now—to justify such 
alarmism.”270  In fact, President Morsi seemed at least initially willing to share some 
power with the Coptic community when he pledged to pick a Coptic woman as his vice 
president. 
Although at first there was may have been sense that at least some within the 
Coptic community were willing to have an open mind and give President Morsi an 
opportunity to be judged by his actions and not conjecture, that grace period appears to 
have expired. Today there exists a measurable level of distrust within the entire Coptic 
community as President Morsi “has failed to deliver on his election campaign promise to 
name a Christian as one of his vice president’s… [while] [h]is Cabinet [only] includes a 
single Christian.”271  There are many within the Coptic Church that believe these fears 
are completely justified because, as a Christian minority in a country run by Islamists, 
there is the perception that the Coptic Community will not be protected by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and as a result they will be subject to increased prejudice and violence from 
Muslim extremists. During the Mubarak regime, Copts’ “enjoyed the protection of a 
regime that had reserved its worst for Islamists, particularly militants with ideological 
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convictions that called for Christians to be disenfranchised.”272  However, since Mubarak 
was ousted, the Copts “have suffered a wave of attacks on their churches, homes and 
businesses.”273  Moreover, the election of President Morsi has created what many Copts 
perceive to as a dangerous security vacuum for Egypt’s largest religious minority. Shadi 
Ramsy, a Coptic engineer from Cairo recently expressed these fears and observed that 
“[t]he culture has changed,… and [a]ny problem no matter how small, that has anything 
to do with Christians is quickly turned into a cause for jihad.”274  Recent protests over a 
independent movie filmed in the United States that portrayed Islam and the Prophet 
Muhammad in a highly negative light has coincided with a rise in the use of “contempt 
for religion” charges being brought against Egyptian Christians as “[t]here have been 
17 court cases involving that charge since January last year, about a third of them in 
recent weeks… [where] [a]nyone convicted of showing contempt for religion can face up 
to five years in jail.”275 
Another area of great concern for the Coptic Church has been the controversial 
process surrounding the Constituent Assembly. The distress for many within the Coptic 
Church is that the Constituent Assembly, dominated by Islamists, will not adequately 
protect their interests within the new Egyptian constitution. This fear has caused large 
numbers of Coptic Christians to demonstrate in protest of the Assembly. Included among 
these critics is Hani Abdellah, a legal committee member for, the Maspero Youth Union, 
a political organization whose mission is to protect the civil right of the Coptic 
community.276  Abdellah recently commented that the purpose behind the demonstrations 
“is to put pressure on the Church leadership to withdraw from the Constituent Assembly 
because the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups are turning this into a religious 
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constitution.”277  The distrust of the process for drafting the new Egyptian constitution 
culminated in the Coptic churches recent withdrawal, in late November 2012, of their 
only the representatives from the Constituent Assembly. Pope Bishop Pachomius for the 
Coptic Orthodox Church spoke about the reasons behind these actions and stated that 
“the Egyptian churches [have] sensed discomfort at the trends that prevailed [while] 
drafting the constitutional provisions. The constitution… in its current form does not 
reflect the pluralistic identity of Egypt, [which has been] entrenched across 
generations.”278  Additionally there is increased anxiety over the expectation that the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist dominated government will be influenced by “the 
ultraconservative Salafis [who] are tirelessly advocating a strict implementation of Sharia 
that could reduce Christians to the status of second-class citizens by barring them from 
certain jobs or forcing them to pay a special tax historically known as ‘“jizyah.’”279 
While there was initially an indication that at least some members of the Coptic 
Church were open to giving the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi a chance to 
prove they were willing to govern inclusively, upon examining the Church’s reactions to 
the most recent political events, the predominate perception of the Coptic community is 
that President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are not trustworthy. There is a 
justifiable fear that the Muslim Brotherhood has Islamized the government to the extent 
that is now threatens the Coptic community’s status as citizens who no longer believe 
they will receive equal protection under the law. Additionally, given the Church’s 
withdrawal of its only three members from the Constituent Assembly, it appears quite 
clear that the Coptic community does not have any hope that the Muslim Brotherhood or 
the FJP will be willing to compromise in a democratic way. Finally, given that the most 
prominent Coptic member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Rafiq Habib, has departed the  
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organization and the new Secretary to the Pope has publicly rejected the new constitution, 
the distance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic community has never been 
so vast. 
E. MEDIA’S PERCEPTION  
A free and unbiased media corps is essential for Egypt’s transition to democracy. 
It is critical for the electorate to have transparent access to information. In essence, this is 
the third of Dahl’s five fundamental elements or criteria required by democracy—the 
“enlightened understanding.”280  In a functioning democracy, the electorate and their 
representatives must have a full and unencumbered understanding of the issues and 
events that shape the political landscape. The source of this understanding comes from 
the media and press whom are typically the custodians of the “enlightened 
understanding” required by Dahl. Under Mubarak, the media and the outflow of state 
information was tightly controlled and manipulated by the regime. If the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the FJP are truly intent on transitioning Egypt to a democracy, there 
must be a change in the state’s approach to controlling the media and the outflow of 
information to the Egyptian populace.  
In terms of democratic perception by the press, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
President Morsi appear to have earned a negative reputation. In fact, the first few months 
of Morsi’s administration have been characterized by Mubarak-like attempts to restrict 
and control information. Indeed, there have been “[s]everal recent moves by government 
authorities against Egyptian journalists [that] have drawn sharp criticism from the news 
media and led to accusations that the country’s new Islamist president is willing to 
tolerate—if not employ—the same heavy-handed tactics used by former President 
Mubarak to stifle dissent.”281  By way of example, in August of 2012, the Morsi 
government shut down a satellite television channel because one of its programs was 
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hosted by Tawfik Okasha.282  An ardent critic of President Morsi, Okasha used 
threatening language that suggested the use of violence against Morsi and the 
Brotherhood.283  And although Okasha’s words were certainly over the line, “the 
government’s actions have revived concerns about the methods the Islamists are willing 
to employ in order to strengthen their hold on power.”284  
Additionally, organizations such as Reporters Without Borders have issued 
concerns over the Morsi administration’s actions that have restricted the printed media as 
well.285  These concerns were related to the Morsi administration’s confiscation of a 
recent edition of Al-Dustour “from the streets because of an editorial on its front page 
that warned of the Muslim Brotherhood ‘emirate’ taking over Egypt and calling for 
Egyptians to join with the military to fight back against encroaching Islamism.”286  The 
Egyptian media’s response to President Morsi’s use of prior restraint and censorship is in 
keeping with the concerns raised by Reporters Without Borders as “[e]ditors of 
independent newspapers and high-ranking members of the Press Syndicate—a union for 
journalists—have decried the recent attacks of the media.”287  In protest “three 
independent newspapers ran white boxes on their editorial pages to protest against what 
they say are the Brotherhood’s attempts to quell free speech for political purposes.”288 
The Morsi Administration has also been criticized for its perceived prejudicial 
appointments of the state owned media leadership and its editors. Only a month after 
taking office, President Morsi “got the Shura Council—in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has 60 per cent of the 174 directly-
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elected seats—to appoint new CEOs and editors to the state-owned media on August 8[, 
2012].”289  These appointments were not well received by the Egyptian media and press 
corps given that a number of “well known FJP allies were appointed, marking a major 
break with the past, when the state media were extremely hostile to the then-banned 
Muslim Brotherhood… [and] were nonetheless contrary to the wishes expressed by 
journalists and media that they should be made by an independent body.”290   
President Morsi has received its most recent and vehement attacks by the press in 
response to his Presidential decree of late November that facilitated the Islamist 
dominated Constituent Assembly’s completion of a new draft constitution. Egyptian 
media outlet Al Ahram Online reported on December 4, 2012, “that 12 Egyptian 
newspapers will not go to print and five TV channels will go off air Tuesday. Some of 
them run a media strike poster that reads in Arabic ‘a constitution that terminates rights 
and restrains freedoms. No to dictatorship.”291  Moreover, Egypt Independent’s website 
issued the following statement: “You are reading this message because Egypt 
independent objects to continued restrictions on media liberties, especially after hundreds 
of Egyptians gave their lives for freedom and dignity.”292 
One of the areas that has evoked such strong criticism is that the “draft 
constitution which will be set to vote on Dec. 15 allows for the imprisonment of 
journalists in cases related to freedom of expression, and this has prompted wide 
discontent among the media.”293  However, some members of the media have observed 
that this criticism is excessive and that the constitutional provision is supported by a need 
to protect the state:   
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Farrag Ismail, a veteran Egyptian journalist, criticized Egyptian media 
going on strike, saying their demands were not realistic.  
“They do not want journalists who defame and slander people to be 
imprisoned, this is unrealistic,” he said, adding that “if such door is 
opened, even in cases involving public figures, Egypt will plunge further 
into chaos.”294 
Without question, the recent actions of prior restraint on the television and print 
media taken by the Morsi administration have been categorically rejected by the 
independent Egyptian press corps and the international community as reminiscent of the 
authoritarian tactics employed by Hosni Mubarak’s regime. The media’s perception of 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP is one that is seen as “perpetuating government 
control of the state-owned media, which must stop… [because] Media independence is 
one of the guarantees of freedom of information in a country that wants to establish a 
democratic system”295  The most recent political moves by President Morsi have been 
categorically rejected as completely inconsistent with democracy. Consequently, there 
does not seem to be any hope for change from the old regime’s controlling policies with 
respect to freedom of the press that would be indicative and supportive of a democratic 
transition. 
F. JUDICIARY’S PERCEPTION  
The development of an independent and unbiased judiciary is necessary 
precondition for democratic rule. It is the foundation for the rule of law. Moreover, in a 
modern democracy, the base document that forms the rule of law for any nation is its 
constitution. The constitution is critically important because it provides the basic 
protection for the civil liberties that are the hallmark of democratic society. And without 
a strong and viable judiciary, there is no forum within which constitutional grievances 
can be adjudicated and remedied. In contrast, Egypt’s judicial tradition is one that has 
experienced significant restrictions. Under Nasser, the judiciary was subject to a number 
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of political measures that insured the Judges would not interfere with the regime’s 
policies and activities.296  The Nasser regime shaped legal the battlefield in a way that 
would protect its agenda from scrutiny from activist judges.297  Over time, the Judiciary 
has been able to regain some autonomy.298  The judiciary gained political ground to 
maneuver “through open confrontation—though some critical voices did emerge, 
particularly in the Judges Club, a social organization that at times provided a protected 
space for judges to articulate their positions—and more through steady lobbying on 
specific issues.”299  These efforts notwithstanding, the Sadat and Mubarak era were 
characterized by the similar attempts to subjugate judicial independence and place the 
courts well within the grasp of the executive office.300  Among the most common 
methods used to control the legal system were via the “emergency law, the use of military 
courts (allowing the regime to pluck any case away from the regular judiciary and assign 
it to more reliable judges), [and] shuffling detainees (to avoid court-ordered releases).”301   
While the January 25th Revolution and the fall of Mubarak ushered in a new 
wave of hope for judicial reform that would free the courts from the former regime’s 
restrictive measures, the most recent maneuvers of the Morsi administration has caused 
great concern within the Egyptian Judiciary. As previously discussed, Morsi has faced 
strong public disapproval due to his Presidential Decree of November 28, 2012. The most 
vehement critics include “Egypt’s highest judicial body, the Supreme Judicial Council, 
[which] is condemning the decrees granting President Mohamed Morsi sweeping powers, 
branding them ‘an unprecedented attack’ on the independence of the judiciary.”302  
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Across the board the reaction by the judicial community has been exceedingly negative. 
A consortium of respected judges that recently formed a self-titled organization known as 
the “current of independent judiciary” criticized the Morsi decree and released a 
statement declaring the following: “We were confident that maintaining the independence 
of the judiciary’s service was the starting point for achieving a state that respects the rule 
of law, and a genuine democratic state would be the foundation for the prosperity of the 
nation.”303  Additionally, the “current of independent judiciary” criticized the decree on 
the grounds that President Morsi’s decisions were essentially immune from judicial 
review and argued that “[t]he immunisation of political decisions, whether previous or 
subsequent, albeit for a limited period, is not expected to support democracy in any way 
because it will inevitably lead to the first steps on the road to tyranny, not freedom.”304 
President Morsi insists that his decree was only intended to cement the foundation 
of democracy by enabling the Constituent Assembly the freedom to finish drafting 
Egypt’s constitution. Unfortunately the perception of the Egyptian judiciary is that 
Morsi’s decree was a power grab that has had the effect of restricting the powers of the 
court. Such a perception leads to the conclusion that, within the highest levels of the 
Egyptian legal community, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are following in 
the footsteps of the preceding authoritarian regimes and have not expressed the intent to 
transition to democratic governance.  
G. LABOR UNION’S PERCEPTION  
One of the unsung heroes of the January 25th Revolution was the Egyptian 
worker. These laborers were “quick to mobilize in the early stages of the groundswell 
that eventually unseated President Hosni Mubarak, and they deserve more credit for his 
ouster than they are typically given.”305  One of the most significant contributions to 
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Egypt’s Arab Spring was the creation of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions (EFITU).306  This new organization was an important step for Egyptian workers 
and the transition to democracy because it represented a direct challenge to the state 
controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF).307  The ETUF was created in 1957 
and, under the provisions of Law 25 of 1976, it was the only labor union legally 
recognized by the government.308  Historically, the ETUF has been “an arm of the state, 
notwithstanding the dramatic changes in economic and social policy since the 1950s.”309 
This is an important consideration given that one of the most fundamental civil liberties 
for any aspiring democracy is the freedom to assemble.   
Through the regime’s restriction of the formation of labor unions, it was able to 
control the Egyptian workforce through the ETUF. During the Mubarak regime, the tight 
grip would begin to slip as the Egyptian labor force found its voice and “[f]rom 1998 to 
2010, well over 2 million and perhaps as many as 4 million Egyptian workers 
participated in some 3,400 to 4,000 strikes and other collective actions.”310  The use of 
the labor strike would prove to be a decisive weapon during the January 25th revolution. 
On February 8, the newly formed EFITU called on the workers of Egypt to strike in an 
attempt to force Mubarak from the presidency.311  The EFITU’s call was answered as 
“[t]ens of thousands of workers—including those employed at large and strategic 
workplaces like the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the 
subsidiary companies of the Suez Canal Authority, the state electrical company, and 
Ghazl al-Mahalla —… engag[ed] in some 60 strikes and protests in the final days before 
Mubarak’s fall on February 11.”312  Clearly the EFITU, and the organized labor  
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organizations that have followed in their independent footsteps, represent important and 
powerful groups within the Egyptian polity and are key indicators of the transition to 
democratic rule. 
With the preceding in mind, the Egyptian labor movement has had a problematic 
relationship with the newly elected President Morsi. In October 2012, the movement 
“released a damning report accusing President Morsi and his government of betraying 
their promises to Egyptian workers during his first 100 days in office.”313  The report 
accused the Morsi administration of using the media to disparage workers, of firing 39 
union activists, and of prosecuting over 30 others for participating in recent strikes.314  
The labor unions also criticized the Muslim Brotherhood and the Morsi administration for 
failing to pass badly needed labor reform legislation.315  The report stated that Muslim 
Brotherhood and President Morsi have failed to keep its political pledges that were made 
prior to the elections.316  Furthermore, the labor movement expressed displeasure with 
the fact that “[d]espite winning the most seats in the first post-revolution parliament, the 
Brotherhood had still failed to issue the much sought after Independent Syndicate Law… 
even though there are now 1,200 independent syndicates in the country.”317 
The labor union’s perception of President Morsi as a proponent for democratic 
transition is weakened further by the fact that the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood 
appear to be pushing for strengthening the ETUF by reintroducing Law 35/1976 and 
abstaining from enacting laws to protect the freedom of labor associations.  318  These 
efforts have received harsh criticism by independent labor union activists such as Abdel 
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Rahman who argued that “plurality and diversity of local unions in each workplace 
promotes competition and genuine democracy. It is in the interest of workers to be able to 
pick and choose the union that best represents them, and that best protects their 
rights.”319  Others within the labor force are concerned about the Brotherhood’s support 
for the ETUF and have suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood desires “to maintain one 
monolithic trade union federation, because in this way it is easier to monopolize and 
manipulate the union movement for their benefit, to shape it according to their own 
political interests, just like [former President Hosni] Mubarak’s party did.”320 
Most recently, both the ETUF and the EFITU have joined together with other 
Brotherhood political opponents in denouncing the November 21st Presidential Decree. 
Across the board, labor unions decried Morsi’s decree as a blatant frontal assault on the 
current union leadership. The decree changed the standing labor law by cancelling Article 
23, permitted unrestricted age limits for membership. This is a highly contentious move 
because “:Decree No. 97 stipulates that board members of the state-controlled Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation (ETUF) over the age of 60 are to be replaced by newly appointed 
members.”321  The labor union leadership has taken issue with Morsi’s decree because 
they see it as “attempt to replace old members of the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
with newer members of from the now-ruling regime: the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
Freedom and Justice Party.”322  Given that most of the ETUF board members are older 
than 60, critics argue that “Decree 97 directly targets tens of ETUF unionists over the age 
of retirement, 60 years, ‘not because of their age but, because of their political affiliations 
and associations with the Mubarak regime.’”323 
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Independent labor union members have joined the ETUF and voice their 
opposition to the new decree. A member of the EFITU executive board, Fatma Ramadan 
expressed the following concerns in an interview following Morsi’s changes to Egyptian 
labor law: 
“Morsy’s first decree, following his complete takeover of state powers on 
22 November, is a labor decree. This is a clear indicator that Morsy is 
seeking to monopolize the labor movement by first ‘Brotherhoodizing’ the 
Ministry of Manpower, and now the ETUF.”  “Morsy is clearly preparing 
a systematic crackdown against Egypt’s union movement, against the right 
to strike, against the right to organize and against union plurality,” 
Ramadan argues. “Morsy is attempting to put on a mask of democracy as 
he points out that the ETUF leadership was appointed by the Mubarak 
regime. Yet he is not seeking democracy in the ETUF, he is only looking 
to fill the federation’s seats with members of his own regime.”324 
From the preceding, it is abundantly clear that the labor union leadership’s perception of 
President Morsi has suffered a serious injury due to the belief that it is intended to purge 
the unions of their legacy leadership and replace them with Islamists that are sympathetic 
to the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP. 
The labor unions represent an important body of organizations within the 
Egyptian polity and serve quite well as a litmus test for democratic transition. Currently, 
the perception of this powerful segment is that the Muslim Brotherhood is not 
trustworthy, has acted in a way that is consistent with the previous authoritarian regime, 
and does not intend to protect the freedom of association—a common denominator for 
any democratic government. Consequently, the subjective analysis of the labor union’s 
perception of the Muslim Brotherhood is quite negative in terms of measuring their 
democratic intent. 
H. WOMAN’S RIGHTS ORGANIZATION’S PERCEPTION  
Like the Egyptian worker in the preceding section, woman’s organizations within 
Egypt were instrumental during the January 25th Revolution and contributed greatly to 
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the fall of Mubarak.325  However, a full understanding of feminist’s perception of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s current democratic intentions is complicated by the fact that there 
is a “tension that exists between what it means to be a secular feminist in Egypt and what 
it means to be an Islamic feminist.”326  These two paradigms are distinctly different in 
that “[u]nlike the campaigns of secular feminism, which demand equal rights, Islamic 
feminism does not seek to compete with men in all levels of society, because they concur 
that men and women are not equals.”327 
Given this dynamic it is not surprising that the perception of President Morsi and 
the Muslim Brotherhood differs greatly between the two divergent groups. Among the 
secular feminists, the perception of the new Egyptian President and the Muslim 
Brotherhood is largely negative. According to secular feminine activists, the “Muslim 
Brotherhood in fact has a shameful record of marginalizing women in the group, until it 
needs to abuse them to beautify the group’s image.”328  And although the FJP has posted 
women to the supreme committee, the sincerity of these moves by the FJP leadership is 
discounted by secular feminists due to the fact that all of these women were relatives of 
key members of the Muslim Brotherhood.329  Critics charge the Muslim Brotherhood 
with attempting to appear supportive of women’s issues with false pretenses.330  There is 
a residual distrust that emanates from the Muslim Brotherhood’s long history of 
marginalizing women that leads some in the secular feminist community to believe that 
“they show respect to women rights only to hunt a political gain and then they go back to 
mistreating them.”331   
                                                 
325 Ariel Brinkman, “Egypt’s New Feminism,” Diwaniyya Dayan Center Podcast, July 26, 2012, 
accessed October 15, 2012, http://www.diwaniyya.org/2012/07/egypts-new-feminism.html. 
326 Brinkman, “Egypt’s New Feminism.” 
327 Ibid. 
328 Dalia Ziada, “Egypt’s Islamists: Much to Prove on Women’s Rights” CNN, June 28, 2012, 





This fear appears to be justified given the lackluster representation of women on 
Morsi’s presidential advisory team. In fact, “[t]he women’s rights coalition—which 
includes 16 different organizations and Egyptian feminist associations—described the 
number of women on the presidential team… as ‘not satisfying the ambitions and 
demands of women’s organizations, whose goal it was to increase the number of women 
serving in leadership posts within the state.”332  Additionally, many see the failure of 
Morsi to appoint a female vice-president as a broken promise leading many secular 
Egyptian women to perceive the FJP as an organization that is intent on “[i]gnoring 
Egyptian woman and ostracizing them from playing an active role in society [which] has 
led [women] to… losing all hope of a better future.”333.. Moreover, the founding member 
of the Egyptian Feminist Union, Hoda Badra, recently “criticized the Muslim 
Brotherhood for… encouraging its female members to drop their identities as a women 
and conform to the ideology of the party.”334 
On the other side of the spectrum are Muslim feminists and they are 
comparatively more forgiving of the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP. One of the most 
prominent women within the FJP is Azza El Garf. Finding common ground with secular 
feminists, Garf does speak out against such flagrant violations of human rights such as 
the “virginity tests” that were widely reported to have been committed by the military 
against female protestors during March of last year.335  However, Garf also contends that, 
contrary to claims made by secular feminists, “Islamists will uphold women’s rights.”336  
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The difference is that Muslim feminists are far more conservative and the family is 
considered paramount in their world view: 
‘Family is the most important part of life,’ El Garf said. She said the 
husband’s job was to feed his wife and care about his family because 
together they are one.  ‘The woman’s job is to make him happy,’ she 
added. ‘In Western society everybody is an individual. That system 
doesn’t work here.’… She said Islam, which preaches equality between 
the sexes as well as traditional gender roles in marriage, promotes the 
education of women and their place in the work force.337 
In terms of perception, the women’s organizations that were so important during 
the Revolution and the fall of Mubarak observe the Muslim Brotherhood through two 
lenses. From the secular feminist lens, the Muslim Brotherhood is viewed with distrust 
due to a historical track-record of minimizing the role of women in society. Additionally, 
President Morsi is viewed with distrust because of his perceived failure to post women in 
adequately sufficient numbers to his presidential advisory team and his failure to appoint 
a female vice president as promised. In contrast, from the Muslim feminist lens, Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood are held in much higher regard due to their conservative 
political agenda that places the priority on traditional gender roles—an agenda with 
which the Muslim feminist is far more comfortable. 
I. SUMMARY OF SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 
The subjective analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic intentions, as 
perceived by the most important stakeholders within the Egyptian polity, indicates that 
the Brotherhood does not have the capacity to negotiate, compromise and pact with 
political opponents. Only the perceptions of the military establishment and the Salafis 
offer any evidence that the Brotherhood is capable of compromise and willing to 
negotiate and share power. With regard to the military, there does appear to have been a 
negotiated settlement between the senior military leadership and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, this partition agreement is problematic because it removes a huge 
piece of political ground, namely the economic might of the military industrial complex, 
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from the realm of democratic control. Additionally, the partition agreement may also be a 
short-term tactical maneuver in furtherance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s long-term 
objective of achieving ultimate control. Egypt’s history is full of examples of the same 
approach used by Mubarak, and the other presidents before him, whereby they entered 
into similar agreements in furtherance of maintaining authoritarian control. 
Additionally, as fellow Islamists, the Salafis should be natural allies and have 
been one of the few organizations within the Egyptian polity that appears willing and able 
to work with the FJP. Yet the Salafis have not been silent partners and have often 
criticized the Brotherhood’s slow and cautious approach regarding the social reform and 
the Islamization of Egypt’s government. Most notably the Salafis’ have taken a hard line 
on amending Article 2 of the draft constitution—a position that has not been shared or 
supported by the Brotherhood or the FJP. Consequently the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
FJP have taken political fire from the Salafis because of the Brotherhood’s soft approach 
with regard to the Secularists and Coptic opposition. As a result, while the Salafis may 
have a neutral to negative perception of the Muslim Brotherhood, it may be due to the 
fact that the Brotherhood is not “Islamist” enough toward the opposition for the Salafis’ 
non-pluralistic agenda. Notwithstanding, as the Egyptian polity becomes more and more 
polarized between the Islamists and the Secularists (as recent events indicate will most 
certainly be the case), it is foreseeable that the Salafis and the Brotherhood will be united 
by their shared Islamic ideology. 
Overwhelmingly, the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood held by the 
remainder of the Egyptian polity examined in Chapter IV does not inspire confidence in 
terms of democratic capacity or intention. The recurring and pervasive theme within the 
subjective reactions of these groups is that they all share a fundamental lack of trust in the 
Muslim Brotherhood. There is simply a deficit of trust that appears almost 
insurmountable in terms of creating enough maneuver space to negotiate and compromise 
on the fundamental issues that separate the Muslim Brotherhood from these opposing 
groups. The secularists and the Copts are united by their fear that the Brotherhood, and 
their Islamist agenda, represents a direct threat to their civil liberties. The media’s 
perception is highly negative due to President Morsi’s failure to make measurable 
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changes in the state’s control over the free flow of information and his willingness to use 
censorship in a way that harkens back to the Mubarak regime. The judiciary, jaded by the 
authoritarian measures and policies instituted to control the courts by the Nasser, Sadat, 
and Mubarak regimes, objects to President Morsi’s decrees as a direct attack on 
democracy and their legal independence. And, as two of the most important participants 
in the January 25th Revolution, labor organizations and woman’s rights organizations 
have been vocal critics of the new administration’s policies that they perceive to be 
oppressive and dismissive of their most pressing political issues. Consequently, the 
subjective analysis of the data examined in Chapter IV is decidedly negative in terms of 
the Egyptian polity’s perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s and the FJP’s capacity, 
















A. THESIS FINDINGS 
1. Summary and Analysis of the Objective Finding’s Regarding the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Democratic Capacity and Democratic 
Intentions 
In Chapter III, this thesis conducted a comprehensive review of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s history, structure, and most recent political maneuvers since the fall of 
Hosni Mubarak. This examination revealed several objective conclusions with respect to 
the society’s capacity to enable a democratic transition within Egypt. The first objective 
conclusion is that the Muslim Brotherhood has developed a political ideology that is 
consistent with democratic governance. Although the influence of Qutb’s writings, and 
the use violence used by Brothers in the past as a means of political expression, have 
troubled many observers, the Brotherhood appears to have disavowed such an extreme 
and violent political ideology. Within Egypt, today’s Muslim Brotherhood has fully 
adopted the philosophy of al-Hudaybi who disdained violent protest in favor of a more 
accommodating and progressive approach that is more consistent with al-Banna’s 
original vision for the Brotherhood as a political movement. It is important to note that, 
although the Muslim Brotherhood’s renunciation of violence and extremism is consistent 
with democracy, it is not dispositive. While the Muslim Brotherhood’s political lineage 
has certainly evolved over time, a democratic ideology requires more than peaceful 
pragmatism. It requires a pluralistic mind-set that accepts the reality there will be 
bargained for exchanges and compromise with political opponents.   
With these considerations in mind, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization 
that can point to its political history and show that it has exhibited the capacity to 
compromise and pact with opponents in furtherance of long term policy goals. Examples 
include the Brotherhood’s willingness to form alliances with the Wafd Party and the 
Labor Party during the 1980s in order to gain a foothold in parliament. Yet, during that 
time, the Muslim Brotherhood was a political outsider and a threat targeted by the 
regime. Today, the Muslim Brotherhood is the regime and since President Morsi was 
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elected, it has shown far less willingness to compromise and pact with political opponents 
than it did 30 years ago. This unwillingness to cooperate politically has been exacerbated 
by the polarization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political opponents and their growing 
level of distrust. All of these factors have greatly diminished any realistic chance that 
Brothers will be willing or able to negotiate political compromises with their rivals. At 
this point, the danger is that any efforts made by the Muslim Brotherhood to form 
political pacts will be rejected as insincere and disingenuous tactics in furtherance of a 
long-term strategy to Islamize the government. Any hope for compromise in the future 
would require substantial and substantive concessions by President Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While such concessions do not appear likely at the time of writing, it may 
become a political necessity if the current level of fervent protest against President Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood escalates and threatens the stability of the country. This 
political necessity will be a certainty if the military and the security forces show signs 
that they are leaning sympathetically toward the protestors. 
While during the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood’s appears to have been at least 
capable (if not willing since taking power) of democratic governance, the structure and 
organization of the Brotherhood appears far less suited for such an endeavor. Due to a 
highly centralized command and control structure, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
enjoys an extremely secure line of communication with its membership. Additionally, a 
pyramid shaped organizational flow chart, along with the strictly enforced recruitment 
and vetting process, largely accounts for the Muslim Brotherhood’s institutional strength, 
patience, and its many thousands of devout followers. Yet this this organizational 
structure is problematic because, while it is well built to defend itself, it is far less capable 
of effectively and efficiently participating in a democracy. The reason is that, within a 
democratic system of government, a political party cannot expect to successfully 
participate with a “winner takes all” approach to policy making. Democratic systems 
favor political parties that have the flexibility and agility to adapt to a highly fluid 
environment. Additionally, this organizational structure does not foster the development 
of political savvy members that can meet with political opponents at the bargaining table 
and craft negotiated compromises that address issues in a pluralistic way. Such 
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agreements rely upon communication between opposing groups and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s organization structure does not support the development of this critically 
important political skill set. As a result, due to its organizational structure, the Muslim 
Brotherhood will have a difficult time compromising with adversaries. 
This is an essential characteristic for a political party in Egypt given the number 
of difficult and pressing issues which include an anemic economy, a dismissed 
parliament, and a highly contentious draft constitution—all of which require immediate 
attention and action. Such political issues are extremely time sensitive. Unfortunately the 
institutional patience and resolve inherent in the Muslim Brotherhood’s structure and 
organization work against solving these complex problems within a timely fashion. But at 
the same time the MB moved quickly and with resolve when it saw openings. So patience 
was clearly a tactic and not suggestive of moderation. In essence, the very characteristics 
that enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to survive years of persecution are the same 
characteristics that will negatively affect its ability to participate within a democratic 
system because to do so requires institutional flexibility and adaptability. The 
Brotherhood’s patient and strict adherence to rigid policy goals may be simply too slow, 
inflexible, and unresponsive for Egyptian politics within the new democracy.  
The third objective conclusion is that the Muslim Brotherhood and its political 
party, the FJP, have a limited capacity for democratic governance. President Morsi has 
made the critical first step in Egypt’s democratic transition by subjugating the SCAF and 
securing the civilian control over the government. His bold moves to replace the old 
guard of the military leadership bodes well for the development of civil-military relations 
and are in keeping with democratic ideals. Furthermore, there appear to be very strong 
indications that the Muslim Brotherhood and the military negotiated a pact prior to the 
public replacement of Field Marshall Tantawi, and other top level general officers and 
security services leadership, that provides at least some evidence of that the Brotherhood 
is willing to compromise. However, the pacted agreement between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Egyptian military appears to have effectively partitioned the state 
between the two opponents in a way that may be problematic for a democratic transition. 
Additionally, President Morsi’s cabinet selections have been criticized by political 
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opponents for stacking the deck with technocrats that are sympathetic, if not actively 
supportive, of the Brotherhood’s Islamist agenda, while largely excluding rivals within 
the cabinet and other high level government appointments. 
Additionally, President Morsi has recently received intense scrutiny and criticism 
over his November 22, 2012 decree that removed his executive actions, and the 
Constituent Assembly’s proceedings, from judicial review. President Morsi has argued 
his drastic measures were necessary to free the Constituent Assembly from external 
interference so that they may conclude their work and draft a constitution that is 
desperately needed in order to continue Egypt’s transition to democracy. Additionally, 
President Morsi has pledged that his decree will only be in effect until the new 
constitution is ratified, at which time it will be rescinded. Although the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political opponents may have reason to distrust President Morsi and the 
removal of the constitutional drafting process from judicial review, it is undeniably true 
that the Constituent Assembly has been stalled for months by infighting and litigation of 
differences in the courts. Moreover, just days after Morsi’s decree (regardless of the 
motivation) the Constituent Assembly was able to approve a draft constitution that will 
go to the Egyptian people via plebiscite on December 15, 2012. 
Notwithstanding, the President Morsi’s decree ensured that the Islamist 
dominated Constituent Assembly would not face interference from the courts or other 
political opponents. This has had the effect of creating a draft constitution that cannot be 
challenged, that is favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda, and that does not 
represent a pluralistic work product in keeping with democratic ideals. The legitimacy of 
Egypt’s new constitution will largely depend upon its acceptance by the populace. 
Therefore, the Constituent Assembly and its proposed constitution represent a litmus test 
for the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to pact with the political opposition. Given the 
current draft constitution approved by the Assembly offers no compromise of substance 
with the Brotherhood’s political opponents, there is no reason to believe they will be 




an analysis of the objective evidence indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP have 
demonstrated a capacity for governance that would be consistent with an illiberal 
democracy. 
2. Summary and Analysis of the Subjective Finding’s Regarding the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Perceived Democratic Intentions  
The subjective analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s perceived democratic 
intentions is even less favorable than the objective analysis. Only the Military 
establishment and the Salafis offer any scant of evidence that the Brotherhood is capable 
of compromise and willing to negotiate and share power. With regard to the military, 
there appears to have been a negotiated settlement between the senior military leadership 
and the Muslim Brotherhood to send the Army back to the barracks. As discussed, the 
civil-military relationship in a democracy demands that the civilian leadership maintain 
positive control over the state’s security forces. President Morsi has appeared to 
accomplish this task and it seems highly probable that he did so with at least the tacit 
support of the mid-level leadership within the Egyptian military’s officer corps. And, in 
this case, the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood is based entirely upon what has not 
been said as that there has been no objection from the senior military leadership—a 
telling sign given the fact that the military had until that point been a rather vocal 
opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood.   
At the same time, assuming that the subjugation of the military was essentially a 
negotiated partition agreement, this may be a double edged sword for Egypt’s democratic 
transition because, while it served to legitimize Morsi’s presidency, it simultaneously 
carves out a significant portion of “political-economic territory” that remains firmly 
within the military’s control. 
The Salafis’ perception of the Muslim Brotherhood is nearly as complex. 
Although, as fellow Islamists, the Salafis should be natural allies and have been one of 
the few organizations within the Egyptian polity that appears willing and able to work 
with the FJP. However, the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood are not politically 
synonymous—nor are their respective political agendas. Consequently, the Salafis’ 
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perception of the Brotherhood is a mixed bag. The Salafis openly criticized the 
Brotherhood and the FJP because of the perception that they are not willing to advance 
the Salafis’ ultra-conservative Islamist agenda. At first glance, this perception appears to 
support the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood lacks the capacity or willingness to 
negotiate and compromise with their fellow, yet more conservative, Islamist party. 
However, the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has received such strong criticism also 
suggests that the Brotherhood has made pluralistic and inclusive overtures to members of 
the Egyptian polity such as the Secularist’s who oppose the Salafis’ agenda. 
Beyond the military and Salafis, the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood held 
by the remainder of the Egyptian polity examined in Chapter IV is overwhelmingly 
negative and does not inspire confidence in terms of democratic capacity or intention. 
The recurring and pervasive theme within the subjective reactions of these groups is that 
they all share a fundamental lack of trust in the Muslim Brotherhood. There is simply a 
deficit of trust that appears almost insurmountable in terms of creating enough maneuver 
space to negotiate and compromise on the fundamental issues the separate the Muslim 
Brotherhood from these opposing groups. The secularists and the Copts are united by 
their fear that the Brotherhood and their Islamist agenda represent a direct threat to their 
civil liberties. The media’s perception is highly negative due to President Morsi’s failure 
to make measurable changes in the states control over the free flow of information and 
his willingness to use censorship in a way that harkens back to the Mubarak regime. The 
judiciary, jaded by the authoritarian measures and policies instituted to control the courts 
by the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes, object to President Morsi’s decrees as a 
direct attack on democracy and their legal independence. And, as two of the most 
important participants in the January 25th Revolution, labor organizations and woman’s 
rights organizations have been vocal critics of the new administration’s policies that they 
perceive as oppressive and dismissive of their most pressing political issues. 
Consequently, the subjective analysis of the data examined in Chapter IV is decidedly 
negative in terms of the Egyptian polity’s perception of the Muslim Brotherhood’s and 
the FJP’s capacity, capability and intent to transition to democracy. 
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3. Conclusion   
The findings of this thesis lead to the conclusion that hypothesis number two has 
been largely substantiated. The subjective analysis indicates that the key members of the 
Egyptian polity do not perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be democratically inclined. 
However, the objective analysis supports the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood 
possesses at least some modicum of capacity to facilitate a transition to an illiberal 
democracy. Therefore, while the Muslim Brotherhood has subjectively failed to create 
the perception that it intends to commit to a democratic transition, the objective findings 
lead to the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood, due to internal or external forces, 
may potentially be compelled to make concessions that will provide the foundation for a 
gradual democratization of the Egyptian government. Assuming that the Muslim 
Brotherhood is not able to complete control over the Egyptian government, an illiberal 
democratic transition is possible so long as there is sufficient political engagement 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and its political adversaries. If these conditions are 
satisfied, the Muslim Brotherhood may be forced to become reluctant democrats—
without total control to dictate policy, the Brothers and their political rivals may be 
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